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Abstract 
 
On the economic effects of policy responsiveness: The role of  
candidate selection for general elections. 
 
by 
 
Marco Alejandro Pérez Mares 
Claremont Graduate University: 2012 
 
 Policy responsiveness to the demands of the whole is important because it is a 
determinant of growth and development: institutions that make governments more inclusive 
favor economic progress and factors that make governments more exclusive inhibit prosperity. 
Growth-enhancing policies likely to please the citizenry include policies that ensure the 
prevalence of the rule of law, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies 
that foster competition, access and the perfection of markets. In contrast, growth-retarding 
policies likely to initiate from the representation efforts of politicians advancing narrow concerns 
include infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation, regulation to rise some price 
or wage, regulation blocking the entry into specific markets, official protection to monopolistic 
markets and adoption of legal barriers against international competition. 
 If policy responsiveness to the interests of the whole favors economic affluence, what 
political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the 
policy making process? This dissertation examines the idea that the incentives provided by the 
intra-party candidate selection methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ 
representation efforts. Expressly, increasing participation and democratization of the intra-party 
nomination process increase the incumbent’s propensity to represent wide-encompassing 
interests and adopt policies that favor economic affluence. In contrast, elite-centered nomination 
methods decrease the incumbent’s incentive to be politically responsive to the interests of the 
whole in favor of the representation of narrow concerns that often demand policies that benefit 
the group at the expense of overall economic growth. 
 Empirically, the idea that aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of 
those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot finds robust support. In the 
developed world, candidate nomination appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic 
practices. Quite the opposite, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory 
politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national 
party leaders and local party bosses. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…Yet estimates of the sources of growth, however meticulous, subtle, and useful, do not 
tell us about the ultimate causes of growth...They do not trace the sources of growth to their 
fundamental causes; …neither do they explain…the “retardants” of growth (p. 4).” Olson, M. 
(1982). The rise and decline of nations: Economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New 
Heaven and London: Yale University Press.  
 
 
Without doubt, unearthing the economic effects of political regimes has proved an 
elusive quest. At best, the empirical literature finds less than persuasive the evidence of a 
connection between political regimes and growth rates of income per capita, with the overall 
effect of democracy on economic growth often regained weakly negative (Sirowy & Inkeles, 
1990; Przeworski & Limongi, 1993; Barro, 1996; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 
2000).  
Despite the on-going debate on the economic effects of political regimes, in his classic 
book The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson [1982] brings attention to an empirical 
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regularity: Economic affluence is regularly observed in a relatively small sub-sample of 
consolidated democracies; i.e., countries with political institutions prone to advance the interests 
of the whole. Policy responsiveness occurs if the institutional structure induces the ruling polity 
to pursue policy frameworks that parallel those favored by the citizenry (Manin, Przeworski, & 
Stokes, 1999a, p. 9; Powell, 2004, p. 91). What, if any, are the economic consequences of policy 
responsiveness? Even if we admit policy responsiveness as a growth-enhancing institution, what 
political institutions matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the 
policy making process?  
Policy responsiveness is important because it is a determinant of growth and 
development. Consenting to the view that the politico-institutional structure make politicians 
exceptionally receptive to the interests of the whole, policies likely to please substantial 
segments of the citizenry include policies that ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and assert 
human rights, policies that protect property and intellectual rights, and policies that foster 
competition and the access and perfection of markets (Barro, 1997, pp. 26-28). Governments 
advancing the interests of the whole may also spend on public goods such as infrastructure and 
schools (Barro, 2000; Feng, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). 
These are policies that have an evident tendency to satisfy the citizenry and lead to overall 
economic growth. 
Quite the opposite, growth-retarding policies likely to develop from the representation 
efforts of government officials advancing narrow concerns include blurry intellectual and 
property rights legislation, infringement on property rights, diffuse patent legislation, 
government imposed price controls, legislation to tax some types of income at lower rates than 
other incomes, enactment of complex tax breaks to protect businesses, inflexible contracts to 
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protect the wages of union members, regulation blocking the entry into specific lines of business, 
official protection to monopolistic markets, import restrictions, and adoption of other legal 
barriers against international competition (Olson, 1982, pp. 44-46; Feng, 2000; Bueno de 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). 
On balance, the extent in which political institutions advance encompassing interests 
rather than narrow concerns favors economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. If 
policy responsiveness favor the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, what political institutions 
matter for the advancement of wide-encompassing interests through the policy making process? 
Concerning policy responsiveness, earlier studies place regularly scheduled elections as 
the paramount selection mechanism for politicians to act in the interest of constituents (Dahl, 
1956; Downs, 1957; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).
1
 The prospect of reelection, in particular, 
makes incumbents receptive to the interests of the whole and so influences the kinds of policies 
public officials pursue (Grofman, 1996). Cohen and Spitzer (1996) examine the relationship 
between incumbents and voters by means of a game-theoretical model in the form of a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. The infinitely iterated game induces rational self-interested incumbents to pursue 
public oriented policies that signal the incumbents’ future performance in office to voters who 
look at floor voting records to decide whom to support. Denzau and Munger (1986) show that in 
the U.S. Congress, the prospect of reelection combined with plurality rule in single-member 
districts constraint the legislators’ propensity to serve narrow interests in favor of the 
representation of the more encompassing group of regular, unaffiliated voters. Members of 
                                                 
1
 Scholars have paid close attention to the effects that various political institutions have on policy responsiveness. 
Contrary to electoral systems of proportional representation that encourage central control and adherence to party 
platforms, scholars have long emphasized the keen linkages created between politicians and voters by systems of 
plurality rule in single-member districts. Term limits in office lessen policy responsiveness. The electoral rule 
restrains voters from using reelection to keep elected officials politically responsive and incumbents in their last 
term have no incentives to serve their constituents’ interests since their efforts cannot be rewarded with an additional 
term in office. Federalism increases policy responsiveness because political power is decentralized to levels closer to 
the citizenry. 
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congress may serve organized interests groups in exchange for campaign contributions and 
political support. However, incumbents act in response to narrow concerns only if the electoral 
benefits attained from the donors’ contributions exceed the costs of their unpopular policy 
choices that reduce their chances of reelection by the masses. Lately, the scholarly literature 
moved forward to examine the politicians’ behavior and policy choices according to the 
reputation building model of politics. Rogoff’s (1990) seminal work points to the notion that 
politicians’ incentive to establish a reputation through the use of public policy can have 
important outcomes. The author constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that 
receives the politician’s political stances and policy choices as signals that are indicative of the 
incumbent’s ability to govern. Electoral prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their 
reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging performance based on the 
politician’s performance. Only those politicians who desire to run for office again must maintain 
a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy among constituents. 
Hence, the re-election mechanism enhances policy responsiveness which also reduces the 
incumbent’s opportunistic behavior. 
This dissertation examines the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party 
candidate selection methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation 
efforts. Explicitly, whose preferences will impact actual policy depends on who governs intra-
party nomination decisions. Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966), Jupp (1968) and 
Ranney (1981) place the locus of power within political parties on those selecting party 
nominees for electoral contestation from among the pool of eligibles.
2
 The logic of their 
                                                 
2
 Although political parties usually sanction nationality, age, residence, personal conduct, and holding of public 
office, only six countries legally address the candidate selection practices observed by political parties: Argentina, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Turkey and the US. For the rest of the countries in today’s western democracies, 
political parties’ systems of leadership election and methods of candidate selection habitually reside within the 
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argument is straight and simple: Aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of 
those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot, or face the threat of losing party 
nomination. While studying the Indian Congress Party, Weiner (1967) notices that candidate 
nomination decisions on the hands of the national party oligarchy party make contenders to party 
tickets willing to advocate the immediate concerns and national policies of party leadership (pp. 
48-49). For Chaube (2003), the potential denial of re-nomination is the key element to 
understand the representation efforts of a member of the legislature to the wishes of those 
making nomination decisions (p. 212). Hence, together with the power to choose party nominees, 
key selection groups influence the legislative work.  
Consequently, increased participation and democratization of the nomination process 
enhances policy responsiveness to the interests of the broader electoral constituency. Democratic 
and inclusive candidate selection refers to the meaningful involvement of the mass public and 
participation of the party membership in the process of choosing candidates for electoral 
contestation (Sartori, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hazan, 2002, p. 117). Following Norris (1996), key 
selection groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, registered voters, grassroots party 
members and democratically elected delegates at regional or national party conventions in which 
nominees are selected by democratic means (p. 203).
3
 In his book Congress: The Electoral 
Connection David Mayhew [1974] develops the case that mandatory party primaries turn 
incumbents in the U.S. Congress exceptionally receptive to the demands of their electoral 
constituencies, often at the point of challenging the directives of the central party leadership. 
                                                                                                                                                             
private sphere of the countries’ legal systems. Hence, in most countries, intra-party institutional structures, internal 
rules, informal practices and conventions oversee the candidate selection process (See Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; 
Katz & Mair, 1994). 
 
3
 In contrast, nomination decisions within parties may be centralized by small oligarchic party elites at the national 
or sub-national level. In this case, key selectorates may be national and regional party bosses, influential regional 
officers, and faction and affiliated interest group leaders (Norris, 1996, p.203). 
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This happens because the initial step in the process of running for public office corresponds to 
that of achieving party nomination -i.e., access to the electoral ballot. Inclusive-democratic 
candidate selection then places potentially large selection groups as the gatekeepers in the 
process of electing a new legislature. In Mayhew’s view, this condition facilitates the 
incumbent’s arduous task of answering to the demands of the party’s grassroots members while 
representing the interests of the electoral constituency as the policy preferences of a large 
selection group draw near to those of the electoral constituency. For reasons of political survival, 
incumbents choose policies and assume stances and attitudes that resemble those of the median 
member within the selection group and the electoral constituency. 
This dissertation builds up on these ideas connecting intra-party candidate selection to 
policy responsiveness, then economic growth and development. My initial motivation is to assess 
the induced propensity of incumbents in national assemblies to pursue policy frameworks that 
resemble those preferred by the unorganized, yet encompassing group of regular voters. Special 
attention is paid to the distinctive efforts of members of congress. By institutional design, in 
democratic regimes the legislators’ choices define, for the most part, actual public policy.  
I posit policy responsiveness by members of national assemblies is largely incidental on 
the simultaneous occurrence of inclusive-democratic candidate selection within parties and the 
availability of legislative reelection. Since legislative reelection has been customary practice 
across contemporary democracies, the degree of democratization of the intraparty nomination 
procedures becomes the center of attention.
4
 The methods employed by political parties to 
choose candidates for general elections greatly vary across nations and across political parties 
within nations. However, if the focal point is the occurrence or absence of a democratic process 
                                                 
4
 Only four nations have banned legislative reelection since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the 
Philippines. The Philippines allows up to three consecutive legislative terms since 1987 and Ecuador changed its 
policy to allow for legislative reelection in 1996. 
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in the intra-party nomination methods, categorization of contemporary electoral states by having 
or not a politically responsive national assembly suggests an economic difference as well as a 
difference in the quality of democracy supplied by the countries’ political systems (See Table 1 
below). 
 
 
 
The economic effects as well as the political consequences of candidate selection are 
identified as subjects deserving closer scrutiny. In the developed world, candidate nomination 
within political parties appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In 
contrast, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most 
part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local 
party bosses. 
If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress 
and policy frameworks as mindful choices, researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-
Legislative reelection
Inclusive-democratic candidate selection Elite-centered candidate selection
Note: As in 2011, immediate legislative reelection existed in all but two nations: Costa Rica and Mexico.
See Appendix A for a list of selected references on candidate selection by country.
See Appendix B for a list of selected references on candidate selection by alphabetical order.
Table 1. Policy responsiveness by members of national assemblies                                                                         
68 contemporary electoral states, as in 2011
Candidate selection within political parties
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland,                         
New Zealand, Nordic Nations, UK, US,                       
Western Central Europe.
Africa, Asia (including Japan and the Asian 
Tigers), Israel, Latin America, Southern Europe: 
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey.
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makers’ motives. Within this line of thinking, the political economy literature often stresses 
differences in political institutions in order to explain policy choices, growth and development. 
While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by 
political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate 
selection have attracted much less attention from researchers in the field of political economy. 
This dissertation adds to the scholarly literature by connecting the degree of participation and 
democratization of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general 
elections to the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks, then growth and development.  
The reminder of this dissertation is broken into four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the 
reader to the empirics of candidate selection from a cross-country, comparative perspective using 
data on candidate selection by the parties in government from 68 contemporary electoral states. 
Intriguingly, categorization of modern electoral states into those in which the intra-party practice 
of candidate selection is carried out through democratic means and those in which party 
nominations are a prerogative of the party leadership closely resembles the standard 
categorization of developed and developing countries. 
In Chapter 2, I argue that the apparent connection between the parties’ choice of methods 
to select nominees for general elections and the countries’ economic performance is not 
accidental, but causal. In order to accomplish this task, I build on Denzau and Munger (1986) to 
present a model of legislative behavior that formalizes the connection between the political 
institution of candidate selection, policy responsiveness, and the adoption of characteristic policy 
frameworks. Expressly, if running for reelection, increased participation and democratization of 
the intra-party nomination process encourages policy responsiveness, which in turn favors the 
adoption of growth-enhancing policies. In contrast, elite-centered candidate selection 
Introduction 
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discourages policy responsiveness to the interests of the whole in favor of the representation of 
narrow concerns that often demand growth-retarding policies. 
I overtly recognize that sound policy is common knowledge. Despite the politico-
institutional environment, political leaders may choose to commit to strategies that promote 
economic affluence at any time. However, if we consent to the general view of institutions as 
growth determinants, the lack of incentives for politicians to act responsive to the interests of the 
whole may lead to detrimental economic outcomes. Chapter 3 inquires into the effects that elite-
centered candidate selection may have on actual policy. Specifically, I argue that candidate 
selection on the hands of the few enables executive prevalence. A number of studies have found 
executive term limits related to increases in government spending and taxes (Besley & Case, 
1995; Johnson & Crain, 2004; Rose, 2006). Since effective governance requires congressional 
support to pass laws, these studies raise important questions of how executives, in particular 
those in institutional regimes of division of powers, are persistently successful in the arduous 
tasks of building a coalition, preserve the alliance’s cohesiveness, and ostensibly lead the 
budgetary process despite a likely environment of multi-party politics and periods of divided 
government.
5
 I propose an alternative view aimed to explain executive prevalence. Members of 
the governing coalition use an informal reciprocity agreement. From this angle, informal 
reciprocity norms, the threat of ostracism from the governing coalition and the practice of elite-
centered candidate selection facilitate coalition bargaining and put the executive in an 
advantageous position to further his/her preferences over policy. Using panel data gathered from 
1970 to 2004 of 17 Latin American electoral states, I find a positive and robust connection 
                                                 
5
 Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) notice that between 1946 and 1999, coalition governments under 
presidentialism formed in more than half of the cases in which official parties did not hold a majority in the 
legislature. 
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between presidential “lame-duck” periods and increases in government spending.6 Furthermore, 
even when spending is on the increase in an executive’s binding term, the government seems 
either unable or unwilling to collect revenue.  
Concluding remarks follow in the last section with suggestions for new research 
directions. 
 
                                                 
6
 If testing the effect of term limits on the incumbent’s choice between alternative policies, legislative bodies 
constitute a poor laboratory. In a country sample of 67 electoral states only four nations banned legislative reelection 
since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines. 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 Candidate Selection for General Elections in Comparative Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
“The nominating process…has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the 
nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is 
the owner of the party (pp. 64, 100).” Schattschneider, E. E. (1942). Party government. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 
 
 
This chapter’s motivation is to bring attention to an empirical regularity. In the developed 
world, the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general elections appear 
largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices. In contrast, events of intraparty 
participatory politics are for the most part absent in the less-developed world, with intra-party 
nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses.  
Previous studies have dealt with the issue of intraparty candidate selection from a cross-
country perspective. However, nearly all of these studies pay exclusive attention to the 
nomination procedures across political parties in western consolidated democracies; e.g., 
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective 
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Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Mair, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1994; Bille, 2001. This chapter 
introduces the reader to the empirics of candidate selection from a cross-country, comparative 
perspective using records on candidate selection by the parties in government from 68 
contemporary electoral states.
7
 Countries in the sample in which the literature identify instances 
of inclusive-democratic practices within parties are Canada and the United States in the 
American continent; Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the Nordic Nations -Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden-, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom in Western Europe; and Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. Countries in 
the sample in which, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions are monopolized by 
the few are Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zambia in 
Africa;  Bangladesh, India, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand in Asia; Israel in the Middle East; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; and 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey in Southern Europe. 
In order to examine the nomination practices within political parties, scholars often rely 
on the structure provided by the empirics of the “Hermens’s” proposition. In his book 
Democracy or Anarchy? Ferdinand Hermens [1941] states that parties benefit from delegating 
nomination decisions to constituency party branches in constituencies electing one or no more 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix A for a list of selected references on candidate selection by country, 68 contemporary electoral 
states. See Appendix B for a list of selected references on candidate selection by alphabetical order. 
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than a few representatives.
8
 With candidates competing for one or just a few seats within a 
geographical demarcation, local party organizations, rather than central party authorities, are 
better positioned to select nominees in each district, since local sections are more competent to 
discern the who is most likely to win the election. Given that both party nomination and the 
election itself are locally determined, elected officials find in their own benefit to remain 
politically responsive to their selection groups rather than to central party authorities. 
Conversely, candidates competing in large multi-member constituencies tend to be 
nominated through more exclusive, elite-centered selection methods. Generally speaking, in 
electoral systems with large multi-member districts, the resulting distribution of seats among 
political parties at the interior of the legislative body is intended to mimic the relative 
distribution of votes among political parties. The electoral formula of proportional representation 
implied by large multi-member districts thus entails the involvement of the central party 
organization in the preparation of party lists. Party lists determine the specific order in which 
candidates obtain a seat in the legislature; with candidates whose names appear at the top of a 
party list enjoying a better chance to obtain a seat. In terms of policy responsiveness, because 
central party authorities either determine or strongly influence the process by which political 
parties generate the party lists, the incumbents’ efforts of representation are associated to the 
interests of the central party leadership rather than to the people they represent. Moreover, 
candidates’ and incumbents’ incentive to remain accountable to their political party leaderships 
positively correlates to their desire to pursue long-run careers in the political arena. Politicians 
would eventually need the support of their political parties in order to further their careers in 
either the legislative or the executive branch, at the local, state, or federal levels of government. 
                                                 
8
 District magnitude defines the number of legislative seats in dispute among competing parties in an electoral 
district. Standard literature considers district magnitude of five or less seats as small, district magnitude between five 
and ten as medium, and district magnitude higher to 10 seats as large. 
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I follow the structure provided by the Hermens’s proposition and develop this section 
accordingly. In terms of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for 
general elections, nonetheless, I find no systematic evidence in support of Hermens’s claim. 
Electoral systems do not seem to have an evident impact on the parties’ choice of method to 
select nominees for general elections (See Table 2 below). 
 
 
 
 Despite the incentives provided by the electoral system, political parties in today’s 
democratic world may adopt either inclusive-democratic or elite-centered candidate selection 
methods to nominate contenders for general elections.
9
 In particular, against Hermens’s 
contention of central party control over the preparation of party lists, inclusive-democratic 
candidate selection methods are observed in a number of parties in countries applying 
                                                 
9
 In addition, a simple inspection of Table 2 reveals that, in today’s democratic world, political parties have an 
imminent tendency to choose nomination methods where decisions are made by the few in institutional settings 
where democratic practices are largely absent. 
Inclusive-democratic             
candidate selection
Elite-centered                                            
candidate selection
Plurality rule in               
single-member districts
Australia, Canada, France,                     
Iceland, UK, US.
Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and 
South Africa in Africa. Bangladesh, 
India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, 
Singapore and Sri Lanka in Asia.
Proportional 
representation
Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,                 
New Zealand, Switzerland, Ireland, 
Nordic Nations.
Latin America; Israel; Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia;  
and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Turkey in Southern Europe.
Sources: Electoral systems, Polity IV dataset. 
                Political parties' candidate selection methods, individual sources.
Electoral 
system
Intra-party candidate selection for general elections
Table 2. Intra-party methods of candidate selection by electoral system                                                                          
68 contemporary electoral states, as in 2011
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proportional representation formulas, mostly across Western Continental Europe. Also against 
Hermens’s argument of a likely involvement of local polities in the nomination of candidates, 
exclusive-centralized candidate selection occurs in a number of parties in countries adopting 
electoral formulas of plurality rule in single-member districts. 
 
1.1. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection in Single-Member Constituencies 
 
 In countries adopting plurality/majority rule to elect representatives from single-member 
districts, democratic-inclusive candidate selection within political parties harmonizes with the 
Hermens’s proposition. Countries in the sample applying electoral formulas of plurality/majority 
rule in single-member districts and in which the scholarly literature identify instances of local 
involvement in the nomination of candidates within major, government-forming political parties 
include Australia, Canada, France, Iceland, the UK and the US. 
 In the UK, the law regulating political parties and their activities is at best vague if not 
inexistent.
10
 British parties are thus free to conduct their internal affairs as they wish. In regard to 
the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections, each political party has its own 
constitution or set of individual rules governing the nomination process. Despite this, candidate 
selection within British parties coincides in three important features. First, British party methods 
of candidate recruitment and selection are highly bureaucratic. Strict formal rules adopted at the 
national and regional levels establish elaborated bureaucratic procedures in order to select 
candidates for parliamentary elections (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995). For instance, the Labour 
                                                 
10
 Following Andrews (1999), UK’s general legislation on associations makes no explicit reference to political 
parties, no laws deal exclusively with political parties as organizations, and election laws focus almost entirely on 
candidate requirements rather than political parties. Party affiliations could not even be included in the electoral 
ballot until 1969. 
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Party has a comprehensive set of statutes establishing the specific procedure to follow in order to 
screen aspirants and select candidates. Rules enable regional officers to monitor the process and 
suggest that all aspirants should be asked the same questions at the final constituency interview 
(Norris, 1996). In the Liberal Party, rules prescribe a multi-stage process in which party 
members and party agencies repeatedly interact in order to choose nominees for general elections 
(Denver, 1988). 
 Second, perhaps because formal party regulations deny central party agencies the power 
to directly nominate a candidate for a local constituency on a regular basis (Webb, 1994, p. 120), 
British parties routinely employ power-sharing schemes in order to select candidates for 
parliamentary elections. Within each party, the process of candidate recruitment and selection 
involve close interaction between the national headquarter and local constituencies. Following 
Norris (1996), British national party agencies may play a front-loaded role by pulling together 
the initial set of eligible aspirants from which local organizations may choose candidates -e.g., 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Scottish Nationalist parties. British central party 
leaderships may also play a back-ended role by refusing endorsement to local nominees -e.g., 
Labour, Plaid Cymru and SNP (p. 207). Candidate selection thus resembles a multi-stage process 
in which aspirants have to face more than one selection group during the nomination process. 
 Third, although nomination processes involve bargaining and agreement between the 
central party and constituency party branches, centrally determined rules provide for substantial 
intra-party inclusiveness and democracy. Formal party regulations establish constituency 
associations in each parliamentary district as the working organizational foundation of British 
political parties (Webb, 1994, p. 120). For all practical purposes, constituency-level associations 
in each parliamentary district play the meaningful role in the selection of candidates for 
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parliamentary elections. The role of constituency-level party organizations entails the advertising 
of vacancies in the House of Commons, the coordination of a series of meetings in order to 
screen aspirants and shortlist, and the selection of the local nominees in internal elections 
regularly decided by simple plurality rule (Norris, 1996). Even though party regulations provide 
central party agencies with formal powers to encourage or obstruct the candidacy of individual 
aspirants, empirical evidence suggests that these powers are hardly ever exercised. Ranney 
(1965) found that between 1945 and 1964 only one locally selected Conservative and ten Labour 
candidates were refused endorsement. Denver (1988) adds to this figures one additional case of a 
locally selected Conservative and one Labour candidate being refused endorsement on political 
grounds between 1964 and 1988. Indeed, for all practical purposes, within UK political parties 
decisions of candidate selection for parliamentary elections are for the most part made by the 
party at the ground through democratic means. 
 Unlike the UK, where the law governing political parties and their activities is diffuse, at 
best, parties in the US enjoy legal recognition under the “Freedom of Association” clause of the 
constitutional First Amendment. Moreover, Court decisions have ruled that the right of US 
political parties to govern themselves takes precedent over state law. Despite this, political 
parties regularly adhere to state laws governing the selection of candidates for Congress and 
most other elected offices.  
 In the US state-regulated party primaries are paramount in the process of selecting 
candidates for general elections. Since the 1960’s, the two major American political forces, the 
Democrat Party and the Republican Party, have held direct primary elections in each of the 50 
states in order to select candidates for general elections. Most states require parties to hold closed 
primaries. Some other states prescribe open primaries in which registered Democrats, 
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Republicans and independents may choose to participate in either primary. In either case, direct 
primaries impede central party leaderships to promote or block nominees at the nomination 
stage. Some state laws even prohibit party organizations from endorsing individual contenders to 
party nomination (Katz & Kolodny, 1994, p. 31). State laws also regulate aspirants’ access to 
party primary and candidates’ access to the electoral ballot. State regulations usually establish 
low barriers to the entry of potential contenders. In most states, aspirants are only required to 
deposit a symbolic fee and present several thousands of signatures from their supporters in order 
to compete in a party convention (Burrell, 1993; Norris, 1996). Because party primaries are 
customary practice and entry barriers to the political market are low, ordinary party members are 
the key selection group in the process of choosing nominees to compete in general elections.
11
 
 
1.2. Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection in Multi-Member Constituencies 
 
Conflicting with the Hermens’s expectation of elite-centered candidate nomination in 
multimember districts, inclusive-democratic candidate selection is common across political 
parties in countries with national assemblies elected through proportional representation 
formulas. Countries in the sample adopting electoral systems of proportional representation and 
in which the scholarly literature identifies instances of local-democratic involvement in the 
nomination of candidates within major, government-forming political parties include Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland in Central Continental 
                                                 
11
 Accordingly, the organization of US parties appears highly decentralized, with each party having state and local 
branches largely independent of the national agencies (Ranney, 1981). Today, above the local level, party 
conventions merely ratify the results of individual primary elections. Party conventions may also serve to accord 
political platforms and party manifestos, and to clarify party issue positions that are not binding on the candidates’ 
behavior (Katz & Kolodny, 1994). 
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Europe; Ireland in Northern Europe; Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the Nordic 
region; and New Zealand in Oceania.
12
 
Legal frameworks concerning political parties and candidate selection in Central 
Continental and Nordic Europe are rather diffuse. Only Finland, Germany and Norway explicitly 
regulate candidate nomination procedures; Norwegian parties, however, are not compelled to 
follow the law. Despite this paucity of legal provisions, nomination decisions across political 
parties in the region are largely made by democratic means with the parties’ rank-and-file often 
playing the crucial role (Hazan, 2002, p. 114).
13
 
The legal frameworks concerning political parties and candidate selection in Finland, 
Germany and Norway are quite detailed. Germany and Norway further share an American 
Heritage. Just after the Nazi surrendered on May 1945, the American, British, and French 
military administrations consented to the re-organization of the German political system as long 
as the goals and internal organizations of the emerging parties were satisfactorily democratic 
(Bawn, 1992). In 1945, Social Democrats met to re-form the SPD, and the new Christian 
Democrat Union (CDU) was officially recognized. 
In order to guarantee that at least a fraction of the Bundestag would be responsive to local 
constituencies, the American administration advanced the introduction of an “additional 
member” electoral system. Since then, under the Electoral Law (Wahlgesetz) of 1949, half of the 
                                                 
12
 I include Germany, Ireland and New Zealand in this category. In Germany, under the Electoral Law (Wahlgesetz) 
of 1949, half of the Bundestag is elected by plurality rule in single-member districts. The other half of the Bundestag 
is elected from regional closed party lists at the state (Länd) level. Proportional representation seats are allocated 
among political forces to reflect in the overall composition of the Bundestag the distribution of votes at the national 
level. In Ireland, the single transferable vote system (STV) requires voters to rank candidates from party lists in a 
number of multi-member constituencies, each with a relatively small district magnitude. New Zealand shifted from 
plurality rule in single-member districts to a mixed electoral system in 1996 after a 1993 referendum. 
 
13
 In fact, Mair (1994, pp. 5-15) and Bille (2001, p. 378) identify a trend in candidate selection across Central 
Continental Europe and the Nordic nations towards higher levels of intra-party inclusiveness and democracy 
between 1960 and 1990. 
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Bundestag has been elected by plurality rule in single-member districts. The remaining 50% of 
the seats has been allocated from regional closed party lists in order to match the share of votes 
won by each political party at the state (Länd) level.  
Because of the rather comprehensive regulatory framework, candidate selection across 
German parties has become a relatively standardized procedure. Article 21 of the 1949 Basic 
Law requires parties to organize in accordance to democratic principles. Section 17 of the 1967 
Party Law makes mandatory the selection of candidates by direct secret ballot of all party 
members at the constituency level, or by a district nominating committee. Paragraph 21 of the 
German Electoral Law addresses intra-party nomination procedures in single-member districts. 
Contenders must achieve party nomination by plurality rule and secret ballot in party primaries 
or a convention of democratically elected delegates at the district level. Paragraph 27 of the 
German Electoral Law addresses intra-party nomination procedures in multi-member districts. 
The selection of list candidates must be either by a convention of local delegates within each 
Länd or by the Länd party conference itself via extraordinary faculties. Delegates, who may 
always put forward names, determine the pool of aspirants in selection conventions. Länd party 
executives may only suggest a list of aspirants. Each place within a party list must be voted on 
starting at the top of the list. Contenders must obtain an absolute majority of the total delegate 
vote to become candidates even if there is only one candidate contesting a particular place, and 
close races may be decided by run-off elections. Aspirants defeated in previous races may 
compete for lower positions. Successful aspirants in single-member districts are free to pursue 
dual nomination in a party list (Roberts, 1988; Poguntke & with Boll, 1992; Poguntke, 1994). 
In Norway, the legal framework regulating candidate selection dates back to the electoral 
reform of 1921. Members to the unicameral Storting would no longer be elected by plurality rule 
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in single-member districts but from party lists in a number of multimember constituencies. 
Because the 1921 electoral reform was expected to impact intraparty nomination processes, the 
parliamentary commission in charge of the electoral reform was required to regulate candidate 
selection. As a result of the Commission’s reliance on the well-documented American precedent, 
the Norwegian Act of Nominations of 1921 recommended a convention model of candidate 
selection. Although not compulsory, Norwegian parties have observed the 1921 Act of 
Nominations with regularity in all but two constituencies, the province surrounding Oslo 
(Akershus) and Oslo itself. Elsewhere, candidate selection for parliamentary elections has 
become a relatively standardized procedure with party lists decided by democratic means in 
party conventions at the constituency level (Valen, 1988, pp. 210-212). 
In practice, the process of choosing nominees to Storting elections usually starts by the 
regional party office appointing a 5-to-15-member constituency nomination committee that often 
gives no representation to the national headquarters and only partial representation to the 
constituency party agency. Following Valen (1988), the primary function of each constituency 
nomination committee is drafting a provisional party list that will assist delegates to organize the 
debate at the nomination convention. Local party branches rely on nomination meetings open to 
the participation of dues-paying members in order to draft their proposals. Dues-paying members 
in the various local party organizations elect delegates to constituency conventions through 
majority rule. Delegates take final decisions on candidacies and rank ordering of party lists in 
nomination conventions at the constituency level. Nomination decisions are systematically taken 
by absolute majority rule in runoff elections and no automatic re-nomination is available to 
incumbents. Aspirants first compete for the top position in the party list. If no candidate reaches 
an absolute majority of the delegate vote, a second election is held between the two aspirants 
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective 
22 
 
obtaining the most votes in the first round. All positions within the party list are filled following 
the same procedure (pp. 222-225). Notably, since 1921 central party leaderships and the 
government itself are legally forbidden from interfering in the selection processes at the 
constituency level. National party agencies, in particular, lack the power to veto individual 
candidacies already agreed at the district level (Valen, 1988, pp. 212-215; Svåsand, 1994, pp. 
317-320). 
In the Netherlands electoral rules prescribe a proportional apportionment of 150 seats to 
the lower chamber, Tweede Kamer, of the bicameral States General, Staten-Generaal, from a 
single national district. However, electoral rules allow parties to put forward party lists in 19 
different administrative sub-districts if they so wish. Dutch parties have systematically chosen 
this alternative convention and present sub-district lists on a regular basis (Koole, 1994). 
Different from Finland, Germany and Norway, political parties in the Netherlands are 
free to organize their internal affairs as they wish, and candidate selection for parliamentary 
elections thus differs across parties. Despite this, the locus of power to select party nominees and 
the subsequent ordering of party lists largely reside in the parties’ rank-and-file at the relevant 
constituency level (Leijenaar & Niemöller, 1997, pp. 119-125). Consider, for instance, the 
progressive Democrats66 (D66) that holds party primaries on a regular basis and, since the 
1970s, has given party members the formal right to choose candidates and the ordering of party 
lists by postal ballot (Koole 1994). In the centrist Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the 
left-wing Labour Party (PvdA), central party agencies may attempt to influence the nomination 
process, often by submitting an advisory list of candidates and ranks. Yet, candidate selection in 
each of the 19 electoral sub-districts is virtually monopolized by regional committees of 
democratically elected delegates from the local party branches (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988). At a 
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glance, the degree of centralization of the decisions of candidate selection in the liberal People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) seems rather high. As a result of an intra-party dispute 
prior to the general election of 1982, VVD party branches lost their institutional prerogative over 
the nomination process to an Election Council of regional delegates presided by the party 
chairperson. For all practical purposes, however, the process of candidate selection begins with 
each VVD sub-regional branch suggesting a list of aspirants, and the final order of party lists in 
each of the 19 electoral sub-districts is determined through democratic means by a 
democratically elected body of delegates to the party congress (Leijenaar, 1993). 
 
1.3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection in Single-Member Constituencies 
 
Contrary to the Hermens’s stance of local involvement in the nomination of candidates to 
compete in single-member constituencies, elite-centered systems of candidate nomination are 
common across political parties with national assemblies elected trough plurality electoral 
systems. Countries in the sample in which the literature identifies instances of nomination 
decisions made by the few through undemocratic means within major, government-forming 
political parties include Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South 
Africa in Africa; and Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka 
in Asia. 
In Africa, executive dominance in the form of neopatrimonialism and personal rule 
hinders the emergence of independent legislative branches. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) 
identify neopatrimonialism as the prevailing institutional regularity in immediate post-colonial 
African regimes. Neopatrimonialism defines the incorporation of classic patrimonialism into 
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modern bureaucratic institutions.
14
 Salient characteristics of neopatrimonial regimes include the 
following. Despite the formal adoption of a written constitution, the right to rule was ascribed to 
a single individual, often a president for life. Political power was concentrated on the executive 
and executive acts stood unchallenged and above the law. Through its dominion over the state 
apparatus, executives and inner circles engaged in systematic patronage and clientelism as the 
basis of political survival. Offices in the public administration often worked to achieve personal 
wealth and status, with various forms of illicit rents associated to the office (p. 270).  
By the end of the twentieth century, institutional politics changed throughout the African 
continent. During the 1990s, nearly all 47 sub-Saharan states became officially recognized as 
multi-party electoral democracies (Doorenspleet, 2003, p. 171). Scholars then relied on the core 
concept of “personal rule” to characterize African executive dominance. Cranenburgh (2003) 
studies a sample of 12 African nations classifying at least as minimal democracies.
15
 The author 
finds that, even in those countries in which multi-party and regular elections are the rule, 
executives concentrate substantial degrees of political power with often “utterly missing forms of 
power sharing” (p. 203). African rulers dominate the domestic policy-making processes, stand 
above the law, their decisions are not subject to institutional checks and they often operate under 
autocratic methods by means of commands, edicts, and decrees (Jackson & Rosberg, 1994). 
Considerable arbitrary discretion, supported by social, civil and political institutions too weak to 
perform checks and balances, make African personal rulers the leading executive and policy 
maker. 
                                                 
14
 See Weber (1968) and Theobold (1982) for a review of the institutional aspects of classic patrimonialism in 
colonial Africa. 
 
15
 Minimal democracies are regimes with relatively free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and the possibility of 
competition in the political system. 
Chapter 1. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective 
25 
 
In today’s electorally democratic Africa, the institutional context surrounding political 
parties and party politics often contributes to the strengthening of executive dominance. First, 
initial movements toward multiparty elections were chronically followed by the emergence of 
one-party systems, frequently without suppressive measures (Doorenspleet, 2003, p. 176). 
Second, internal organizations and practices of African political parties appear largely informed 
by the undemocratic heritage of the colonial rule (Salih, 2003, pp. 1-2). Instead of formal rules 
governing intra-party affairs, small groups of party leaders, often founders, especially those of 
the party in power, dominate party life and candidate selection (Kopecký and Mair, 2003, p. 
289).
16
 Consequently, by the late 1990s, in countries such as Botswana, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa, official parties frequently controlled an 
overwhelming majority in parliament and acted as dependent branches of the executive 
(Cranenburgh, 2003, p. 203). 
Furthermore, even if rulers do not intervene in the selection and nomination of candidates 
for general elections, institutional politics aimed to strength party discipline prevents the 
formation of an independent legislative branch. In addition to the chronic formation of one-party 
systems and controlled intra-party competition, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify high 
legislative turnover (weakening party personalities relative to the executives) and generous 
salary and allowances (related to the capacity of members of parliament to access positions in the 
public administration and engage in redistribute patronage) as conditions lessening legislative 
independence. Cranenburgh (2003, p. 205) adds the threat of expulsion from parliament as a 
measure discouraging party defection and conducive to a docile majority in the legislature. 
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 Despite the enduring control of party elites over party life, the literature records a few attempts to institutionalize 
competitive candidate selection within African political parties. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) identify several 
instances with at least one intra-party competitive election: Cameroon and Togo in the 1980s; Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia in the 1970s; and Côte d’Ivoire after 1980 (p. 71). In these countries, ruling parties held competitive party 
primaries or presented multiple candidates in the electoral ballot. 
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Following Salih (2003), democratically elected legislatures in African are, with the notable 
exception of Botswana, Africa’s longest democratic tradition, “nothing more than rubber-stamp 
officials” (p. 30). 
In India, between the first general elections of 1952 and up to 1977, the Indian National 
Congress Party (NC) ruled unchallenged de facto national politics despite the development of an 
increasingly multi-party system, free suffrage and regular elections. Although it returned to 
power two years later, the NC was successfully challenged in the 1977 parliamentary elections 
by a multi-party coalition headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since then, Indian politics 
has developed into a consolidated multiparty system drifting towards increasing party 
fragmentation, factionalism and regionalism (Jana & Sarmah, 2002; Pai, 2002).  
Even though party politics has become increasingly competitive, decisions on candidate 
selection for general elections across political parties remain highly centralized on the hands of 
the few. A report submitted in 2002 by The National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution (available at www.lawmin.nic.in) reveals that, over the last fifty years after 
independence, political parties exhibit unclear criteria governing candidate selection, show a 
marked absence of intraparty democratic practices, and deny a meaningful role to local polities 
in the selection of candidates for general elections (p. 425).
17
 Of particular relevance to Indian 
politics is the National Congress Party, today’s only Indian party with national presence. In the 
NC, the degree of centralization of candidate selection decisions has always been rather high. 
Following Dasgupta (2002, p. 25) and Chandra (2004, p. 103), the NC reached its highest level 
of centralization in 1972 when Indira Gandhi, then party leader of the NC, made the right to allot 
party posts and nominations the formal and exclusive prerogative of the national leadership. 
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 In order to control bossism within party parties, the Report suggests the introduction of democratic procedures for 
the nomination of party candidates by primary elections or by giving a significant say to local party units. 
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1.4. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection in Multi-member Constituencies 
 
In countries electing members to their national assemblies from multi-member 
constituencies, elite-centered candidate selection harmonizes with the Hermens’s notion of 
central party leaderships being decisive at preparing party lists. Countries in the sample adopting 
electoral formulas of proportional representation in which the literature identify instances of 
nomination decisions made by the few through exclusive and undemocratic means within major, 
government-forming political parties include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand in Asia, 
Israel in the Middle East; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Latin America; and Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey 
in Southern Europe. 
In Japan, for instance, the Constitution of 1946 establishes a parliamentary democracy 
that grants exclusive power over legislation to the bicameral National Diet (Kokkai). Between 
the two constitutive chambers of the National Diet, the Japanese constitution further affirms the 
supremacy of the House of Representatives (Shugiin) over the House of Councillors (Sangiin) by 
vesting the former with exclusive faculties over the appointment of the prime minister, the 
enactment of laws and the discussion and approval of the annual budget and international 
treaties. 
Since inception of direct democracy after WWII and up to 1994, the Japanese electoral 
law prescribed simple majority rule and a single non-transferable vote system (SNTV) in multi-
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member districts to elect members to the House of Representatives.
18
 An electoral reform in 
1994 changed the formula to elect members to the Shugiin to a two-ballot system overlapping 
plurality rule in a number of single-member districts and proportional representation in 11 multi-
member constituencies. Although multi-party politics has been the rule since inception of direct 
democracy, the Liberal Democratic (LDP) has largely dominated national politics. From 
foundation in 1955 until the general election of 1993, only in 1976 and 1980 had the LDP relied 
in coalition politics in order to lead government.  
In Japan, the nomination of candidates to Shugiin elections is carried out under a 
bureaucratic setting of party constitutions and rulebooks empowering national and factional party 
leaders with the authority to decide on the selection and nomination of candidates. Following 
Hrebenar (1992), Japanese parties fit Duverger’s 1964 definition of “cadre” party with highly 
centralized structures, exclusive membership and well-organized and cohesive intra-party 
factions competing for political influence and financial resources. Accordingly, Shiratori (1988) 
and Fukai and Fukui (1992) identify intra-party personality-led factions as the key selection 
groups in the nomination of candidates. 
In Latin America, all through the region, candidate nomination is either solely on the 
hands of the national party leadership or regional party bosses and leaders of intraparty factions 
control the selection of candidates to general elections (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 267). For 
instance, in Argentina, the Constitution prescribes a presidential and federal system of 
government with a bicameral legislature. Election of representatives to the lower chamber occurs 
through a proportional representation formula with closed party lists. Electoral rules establish 23 
provincial territories and the federal capital as to form 24 electoral districts with varying district 
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 In Japan, operation of the SNTV up to 1994 meant that each elector had a single vote to cast in districts electing 
between three and five members to the Shugiin. 
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magnitude. Since 1946, only three political parties have ever played a meaningful role at the 
national level: the Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ), the Radical Civic Union (Unión 
Cívica Radical, UCR) and only recently the Solidarity Country Front (Frente País Solidario, 
FREPASO). In all three major political forces, party leaders at the provincial level often play the 
decisive role in the selection of candidates and rank-ordering of party lists (Escudero, 2001). 
Argentinean governors, in particular, enjoy political recognition and access to public resources 
that furnish them with effective control over the selection of candidates to legislative elections 
(De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002). 
In Brazil, as in Argentina, the electoral rule to elect members to the lower chamber is a 
proportional representation formula applied to a number of multi-member districts. The Brazilian 
party system, however, greatly differ from most party systems in the Latin American region. In 
Brazil, the party system is highly fractionalized with just a few parties maintaining a national 
presence and a large number of political forces playing a relevant role only at the local and 
regional level. 
In regard to the nomination of candidates for general elections, Guzman and Sena de 
Oliveira (2001) give an account of the crucial role played by the national party leaders and 
regional party bosses in some of the most relevant national political forces: the Labor 
Democratic Party (Partido Democratico Trabalhista, PDT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
Party (Partido del Movimento Democratico Brasilero, PMDB), and the Brazilian social-democrat 
Party (Partido de la Social Democracia Brasileña, PSDB). Together with national and regional 
party officials, Samuels (2002) uncovers the meaningful role played by the Brazilian state 
governors at preparing party lists when the selection of candidates is carried out at party 
conventions. Moreover, history shows that state governors have been decisive at determining the 
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future fate of incumbents in the Brazilian lower chamber as many of them come from and will 
continue their careers at the state level, a condition lessening legislative independence. 
Unlike any other country in the Latin American region, Brazilian parties are legally 
required to include in their party lists the name of those incumbents willing to run for reelection 
(candidato nato). At a first sight, the candidate nato stipulation may seem to increase the 
incumbents’ incentive to remain responsive to regular voters instead of those in the party 
hierarchy preparing the party list. However, Brazilian party leaders benefit from a set of 
institutional prerogatives aimed to compel party discipline. Among these conditions 
strengthening central party control over individual legislators, Cheibub, Figueiredo and Limongi 
(2000) expose the power of party leaders to include in each party list more candidates than seats 
available for competition; control over the candidates’ access to free TV time; control over 
committee assignments, the legislative agenda, and the amendment process; and the relevance of 
the political parties to advance the politicians’ political careers.  
In Chile, the binomial electoral system is fundamentally a proportional representation 
formula with large minority representation. Applied in a number of two-member districts, the 
binomial system allocates both seats to the parties polling the largest number of votes, unless the 
leading political force doubles the number of votes of its closest competitor. In this case, the 
leading party takes both seats in the electoral district.  
Since re-inception of direct democracy in 1989 after a period of military rule, the Chilean 
binomial formula has produced two long-lasting coalitions with national presence: the 
“Concertación por la Democracia” and the “Alianza por Chile”. However, the coalition essence 
of the Chilean party system does not favor the democratization of the candidate selection 
processes. Following Scully (1995) and Siavelis (2002), in order to guarantee coalition 
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cohesiveness, party leaders must engage in negotiations that require discretionary decisions in 
the nomination of candidates and high levels of party discipline. 
In sharp contrast to the tradition of local-democratic candidate nomination methods found 
in Continental and Northern Europe, scholars identify instances of rather elite-centered candidate 
selection across parties in Southern Europe. In Spain and Portugal, partisan decision-making and 
candidate selection are carried out by undemocratic means and outside the realm of regular party 
members (Kohler, 1982). Candidate nomination reaches utterly levels of centralization in 
Greece, Italy and Turkey, with political parties built around individual personalities and national 
party leaders monopolizing candidate nomination decisions. 
In Greece, the electoral law stipulates a 3-tier open-list proportional representation 
system to elect 300 members to the national assembly from 56 local districts, 13 regional multi-
member constituencies, and a single national district. Since the 1970s, when Greece became fully 
democratic after a period of authoritarian regime, the country has developed into an effective 
two-party system. Today, only the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the socialist PASOK 
play a meaningful role in national politics. In the ND as well as in the PASOK, national party 
leaders directly control candidate nomination (Gallagher, 1988a, p. 244). In particular, at its 1977 
national congress, ND party members made the practice of elite-centered candidate selection 
official by approving complete authority over the nomination of candidates for general elections 
to the national party leader (Kohler, 1982, p. 121). 
Ever since 1948, Italy has been a republican unitary state and semi-parliamentary 
democracy with a bicameral legislature. Since the Italian constitution makes no specific 
distinction between the upper Senato della Repubblica and the lower Camera dei Deputati, 
legislative authority is equally vested in both houses,  
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From 1948 and up to 1993, members to the Italian bicameral legislature were elected 
simultaneously, for terms that may not exceed five years, through a formula of proportional 
representation applied to a number of multimember districts (open-list for the lower chamber, 
closed-list for the upper chamber). Even though the Italian Constitution has always recognized 
political parties as organizations since return to direct democracy after WWII, in pre-1993 Italy 
there was no legal framework regulating the intra-party nomination practices for parliamentary 
elections (Wertman, 1988). During this period, Bille (2001) identify national party organs largely 
controlling candidate nominations and central leaderships’ influence going beyond that stipulated 
in the rules. Particularly relevant in pre-1993 Italy was the Christian Democratic Party (CD). 
Even though Italy has been a multi-party democracy since the 1940s with at least eight parties 
obtaining continuous representation in Parliament, the CD was able to lead most governing 
coalitions. In regard to candidate selection within the CD, rule books precluded regular party 
members from participating in the nomination process. Instead, party rules favored provincial 
CD’s top organs as the key selection groups in the nomination process, with provincial party 
decisions subject to the approval of the national leadership (Wertman, 1988, p. 149).  
The breakdown of the First Republic in the 1990s brought, after an April 1993 
referendum, the adoption of new electoral rules. Members to the Italian Parliament in both 
houses are now elected under a two-ballot mixed formula with roughly 75% of the seats filled by 
plurality rule in single-member districts and 25% by a system of proportional representation. In 
contemporary Italy, Bardi and Morlino (1994) identify centralized control over parliamentary 
recruitment and the power of the national party leadership to determine parliamentary behavior 
as continuing well effective into the 1990s despite the introduction of new electoral rules in 1993 
(p. 260). 
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A simple cross-country inspection of the intra-party nomination practices to select 
candidates for general elections reveals an empirical regularity. Political systems in countries 
with government-forming political parties following inclusive-democratic nomination methods 
are prone to advance economic progress as well as civil and political rights. Quite the opposite, 
political parties in the less developed world habitually choose exclusive-centralized candidate 
selection methods. The next chapter sets out to investigate the economic effects of candidate 
selection of candidate selection. 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
The Political Economy of Policy Responsiveness in Democratic Regimes:  
The Role of Candidate Selection for General Elections 
 
  
 
  
 “Commerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does not 
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the 
possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which 
the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of 
debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufacturers, in short, can seldom 
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of 
government (p. 539).” Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of 
nations. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.  
 
 
 After decades of scholarly work, the debate concerning the economic effects of political 
regimes is far from settled. In principle, democratic governance advocates political rights and 
civil liberties; both factors that advance property and contractual rights that, in turn, promote 
security to work and save, efficient investments and encourage the flow of information in the 
markets. Ostensibly, democracy precludes reckless expropriation of resources and assets, and 
predisposes the development of third-party mechanisms of contract enforcement. Yet, 
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democratic governments, rather than authoritarian regimes, have an understandable tendency to 
respond to the public’s political pressures and demands. Universal suffrage and the right of 
workers to unionize threaten private property and property rights, both critical elements for 
economic affluence (North, 1990). On the other hand, authoritarian regimes vest rulers with the 
essential command and control to carry out the economic reforms needed to foster growth and 
development. However, there is nothing to ensure that the autocrats’ commitment will be to 
growth-enhancing policies. And even if conditions for such commitment do exist, autocrats may 
not be able to prove this a lasting pledge (Olson, 1991). 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical literature examining the economic effects of 
political regimes reports mixed results. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi’s (2000) 
study of 135 economies find little evidence of a trade-off between the form of government and 
growth rates of total income. Barro (1996) analyzes the relationship between democracy and 
economic performance for a sample of 100 countries. After controlling for the rule of law, 
economic freedom, government consumption, and human capital, the overall effect of democracy 
on economic growth appears weakly negative. After surveying 21 cross-country studies, 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) find less than persuasive the evidence of a connection between 
political regimes and income per capita growth rates. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) review thirteen 
cross-national quantitative studies on the relationship between systems of government and the 
pace of economic growth; four of which find a positive although conditional correlation, three 
regain a negative association, and six report no connection whatsoever. Indeed, if we accept the 
role of political institutions as economic growth determinants, differences in political regimes 
may not be noteworthy.  
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 Despite the on-going debate on the economic effects of political regimes, in his classic 
book The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson [1982] exposes an empirical regularity: 
economic affluence is regularly observed in a relatively small sub-sample of consolidated 
democracies; i.e. countries with political institutions prone to advance the interests of the whole.  
 In the previous chapter, I presented supportive evidence that in the developed world, 
intra-party candidate selection for general elections is largely informed by inclusive and 
democratic practices. Quite the opposite, in the less-developed world events of intraparty 
participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized 
by national party leaders and local party bosses. In this chapter, I develop the case that the above 
empirical regularity is not accidental, but causal. In line with Olson (1982), who works the case 
that politicians with an incentive to respond to the demands of the whole favor the adoption of 
growth-enhancing policies, I argue that the incentives provided by the intraparty candidate 
selection practices are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation efforts, then 
growth and development. Explicitly, if running for reelection, inclusive-democratic intra-party 
nomination methods turn politicians receptive to wide-encompassing interests and inclined to 
pursue policies that favor economic affluence. Conversely, away from democratic practices, 
nomination decisions on the hands of the few turn incumbents responsive to narrow concerns, 
hence inclined to pursue policies that may benefit the few at the expense of overall economic 
growth. 
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2.1. The Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness 
 
 Policy responsiveness occurs if the institutional structure induces the ruling polity to 
pursue policy frameworks that parallel those favored by the citizenry (Manin, Przeworski, & 
Stokes, 1999a, p. 9; Powell, 2004, p. 91). Policy responsiveness is important because it is a 
determinant of growth and development: Institutions that make governments more inclusive 
favor economic affluence and factors that make governments more exclusive inhibit prosperity.  
 For instance, in order to explain variations in growth rates of income per capita, Olson 
(1982) builds on the notion that the incentives facing encompassing organizations are different 
from those facing organizations representing only a narrow segment of the society. Sufficiently 
encompassing organizations have an important incentive to be actively concerned about how 
productive the society is because members of these organizations expect to internalize much of 
the cost of inefficient policies. Accordingly, inclusive organizations give some weight to 
economic growth and the interests of society as a whole (p. 53).   
 Quite the opposite, Olson (1982) expects small, special-interest organizations such as 
coalitions, cartels, lobbying organizations, professional associations, labor unions, trade 
associations and oligopolistic collusive groups to engage in rent seeking to derive economic rents 
from programs and policies that bring direct benefits to their members, even if these programs 
imply a loss in overall economic efficiency and aggregate output. Olson explains his logic by 
noticing that interest groups typically represent only a miniscule percentage of the population 
and the costs of the policies fell disproportionately on the unorganized (p. 43). One of the 
obvious ways in which a special-interest group can increase the income of its members while 
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reducing the efficiency and output of the society is by lobbying for legislation to raise some price 
or wage or to tax some types of income at lower rates than other income (p. 44). Another way is 
through cartelization; members of the interest group can collude to reduce output and set a higher 
price just as a single monopolist would have done (p. 43). Moreover, effective cartels must 
always block entry into the line of business in which they have raised the price. Lobbying for 
legislation that creates permanent barriers to entry deters new firms to come into the line of 
business by making initial investments and costs greater (p. 46). 
 In their 2003 Logic of Political Survival, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and 
Morrow advance the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory addresses how political 
institutions for selecting leaders shape the incentives the politicians in power have to pursue 
policies that promote or inhibit growth and prosperity. The authors build upon two basic 
concepts: the “selectorate” that represents the citizenry with an institutional right to participate in 
choosing the country’s government and the “winning coalition,” a subset of the selectorate that 
includes those whose support is essential to maintain the incumbent leader in office; defection 
from any member of this group implies the leader’s removal. On the premise that leaders allocate 
resources to most efficiently reward the group whose backing is essential to keep them in office 
(p.173), holding the size of the selectorate constant, leaders who are backed by a small coalition 
have an obvious tendency to use private rewards that only benefit coalition members. As the 
winning coalition increases in size, incumbents find in their own benefit to pursue publicly 
oriented policies and pour spending resources on public goods for their coalition of supporters. 
To the extent that prosperity is widely valued, leaders backed by large winning coalitions and a 
large selectorate have incentives to pursue policies that promote economic affluence. Hence, 
universal suffrage, in general, and majoritarian systems, in particular, create a strong push for 
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leaders to pursuit good policies than do other systems with smaller winning coalitions. In a few 
words, leaders whose base of support is small necessarily favor narrow programs and spending 
that merely reward coalition members, often at the expense of public welfare. Conversely, 
leaders who need the support of a large coalition to remain in office promote social welfare and 
economic affluence by pursuing policies and programs likely to benefit the whole. 
 Briefly, growth-enhancing policies likely to please the citizenry include policies that 
ensure the prevalence of the rule of law and assert human rights, policies that protect property 
and intellectual rights, and policies that foster competition and the access and perfection of 
markets (Barro, 1997, pp. 26-28). Governments advancing the interests of the whole may also 
spend on public goods such as infrastructure and schools (Barro, 2000; Feng, 2000; Bueno de 
Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). These policies have an evident tendency to satisfy 
a large number of citizens and lead to overall economic growth. Growth-retarding policies likely 
to develop from the representation efforts of public officials advancing narrow concerns include 
blurry intellectual and property rights legislation, infringement on property rights, diffuse patent 
legislation, government imposed price controls, legislation to tax some types of income at lower 
rates than other incomes, enactment of complex tax breaks to protect businesses, inflexible 
contracts to protect the wages of union members, regulation blocking the entry into specific lines 
of business, official protection to monopolistic markets, import restrictions, and adoption of 
other legal barriers against international competition (Olson, 1982, pp. 44-46; Feng, 2000; Bueno 
de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). 
 On balance, the extent in which political institutions advance encompassing interests 
rather than narrow concerns assists economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth. If 
policy responsiveness favors the adoption of growth-enhancing policies, what political 
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institutions matter for the advancement of the interests of the citizenry through the policy making 
process?  
 
2.2. The Institutional Determinants of Policy Responsiveness 
 
 The scholarly literature has evolved to acknowledge policy responsiveness as a variable 
identifiable along a multi-point scale, depending upon specific institutional arrangements 
(Powell, 2004; Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999b). For instance, Powell (2004) looks at 
policy responsiveness in democratic regimes as an outcome of an ongoing and dynamic multi-
stage process that begins with the policy preferences held by citizens, and moves through stages 
such as the citizens’ voting behavior, election outcomes, coalition and government formation, 
and the policy-making process itself. In Powell’s view, systematic policy responsiveness may 
arise through the adoption of enforcing mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability at 
every stage of the chain of political responsiveness.
19
 
 Within the above line of thinking, the scholarly literature pays attention to the effects that 
several political institutions have on the politicians’ propensity to represent the broader interests 
through the policy-making process. Concerning policy responsiveness, earlier studies place 
regularly scheduled elections as the paramount selection mechanism for politicians to act in the 
interest of constituents (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). The prospect of 
reelection, in particular, makes incumbents receptive to the interests of their constituencies and 
                                                          
19
 Noticeably, along the literature on democratic institutions and policy responsiveness prevails the view that 
effective electoral competition and regular elections are at best necessary, yet insufficient instruments of control to 
keep politicians receptive to the interests of their constituencies. Arguably, for reasons of political survival, voters’ 
power to replace an unpleasant government through regular elections would make politicians receptive to the 
demands of their constituencies. However, the complexity of institutional arrangements in which modern 
democracies present themselves makes uncertain the emergence of policy responsiveness (Manin, Przeworski, & 
Stokes, 1999b, p. 50). 
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thus influences the kinds of policies public officials pursue (Grofman, 1996).
20
 For instance, 
Cohen and Spitzer (1996) inquire into the effects that reelection and term limits have on the 
politicians’ policy choices. Using a game-theoretical model in the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
the authors show that the infinitely-iterated game induces rational, self-interested incumbents to 
pursue public oriented policies. These policies signal the incumbents’ future performance in 
office to regular voters who look at floor voting records to decide whom to support. In the 
infinitely-iterated game, policy responsiveness increases the incumbents’ chances to stay in 
office. Denzau and Munger (1986) show that in the U.S. Congress, the prospect of reelection 
combined with plurality rule in single-member districts curb the legislators’ propensity to serve 
narrow interests as opposed to the interests of the more encompassing group of the regular, 
unaffiliated voters. Politicians serve organized interests groups in exchange for campaign 
contributions and political support. However, incumbents act in response to the often growth-
retarding demands of private interests only up to a point in which their policy choices do not 
harm their chances of reelection by the growth-oriented masses.  
 Lately, the scholarly literature moved forward to examine the politicians’ policy choices 
according to the reputation building model of politics. Rogoff’s (1990) seminal work points to 
the notion that the incumbents’ incentive to establish a reputation through the use of public 
policy can have important outcomes. The author constructs a model based on a forward looking 
electorate that receives the politician’s political stances and policy choices as signals that are 
indicative of the incumbent’s ability to govern. Electoral prospects create an incentive for 
politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking electorate who may be judging 
performance based on the politician’s performance. Those politicians who desire to run for office 
                                                          
20
 Reelection refers to the institutional prerogative of incumbents to compete for re-nomination and run for office in 
consecutive terms. 
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in consecutive terms must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible 
economic policy among constituents. Hence, the re-election mechanism enhances policy 
responsiveness which also reduces the incumbent’s opportunistic behavior. 
 In contrast, term limits in office lessen policy responsiveness. The electoral rule restrains 
voters from using the re-election mechanism to keep incumbents politically responsive. In the 
Cohen and Spitzer’s (1996) Prisoner’s Dilemma model, term limits produce a non-cooperative 
outcome. Term limits suppress the electorate’s control over the incumbents’ representation 
efforts by denying voters the opportunity to express satisfaction or disagreement with the 
conduct of their representatives. Consequently, incumbents lose the incentive to respond to the 
demands of their constituencies because voters cannot reward politicians, even those public-
oriented, with an additional term in office. Indeed, incumbents in their last term may not be 
prevented from pursuing policies different from those preferred by their constituencies 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Cohen & Spitzer, 1996).
21
 Concerning the economic effects of term 
limits, Besley and Case (1995), Johnson and Crain (2004) and Rose (2006) have confirmed that 
executive term limits are related to increases in public spending, tax revenue and fiscal volatility. 
These findings are attributed to the lack of incentives lame-duck executives have to stay 
responsive to the electorate since a good reputation in matters of economic policy will be of no 
use for the politicians’ future political purposes (Rogoff, 1990).  
 Electoral systems may impact political responsiveness. Contrary to systems of 
proportional representation that encourage central control and adherence to party platforms, 
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 In addition, term limits in office have been related to a number of phenomena influencing policy outcomes. Term 
limits remove experience and professionalism from the legislature and strengthen the role and influence of interest 
groups vis-à-vis with the legislature (Polsby, 1991, 1993). Legislative term limits cause a shift of power towards a 
more powerful executive (Glazer & Wattenberg, 1996). In addition to shifting the balance of political power away 
from the legislature, legislative term limits shortens the incumbents’ time-horizon preferences over the legislative 
work (Cohen & Spitzer, 1996; Gerber & Lupia, 1996; Sartori, 1994; Verney, 1992). 
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scholars have long emphasized the keen linkages created between politicians and voters by 
systems of plurality rule in single-member districts.
22
 Carey and Shugart (1995) develop a 
method for estimating the relative value to candidates and incumbents to develop personal 
reputations, as opposed to party reputations, in order to advance their political careers. After 
controlling for four variables common to all electoral systems, namely access to the electoral 
ballot, vote pooling, the way in which voters are allowed to cast their votes and district 
magnitude, the authors’ method produces a multi-point ordinal scoring individual candidates’ 
incentive to develop personal or party reputations. Overtly, plurality rule in single-member 
districts induces the highest propensity of contenders to identify and represent the immediate 
concerns of their constituents.
23
 
  Federalism is thought to increase policy responsiveness. The normative view to this line 
of thought can be traced back to Tiebout’s (1956) “pure theory of local expenditures.” 
Accordingly, federalism brings about forces that resemble those of a free market. Sub-national 
governments compete with each other for taxpayers that make their residential location decisions 
depending on the jurisdictions’ offerings of services, provision of public goods, and levels of 
taxes. Because political power is decentralized to levels closer to the citizenry, federalism 
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 However, an opposing view maintains that systems of proportional representation tend to reproduce in congress 
the citizenry’s ideological distribution and so may be related to greater policy responsiveness than systems of 
plurality rule in single-member districts. 
 
23
 Empirical studies have found supporting evidence that electoral systems influence policy choices and outcomes. 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) find that countries electing 
legislatures through proportional representation systems tend to indulge in fiscal indiscipline with respect to those 
applying plurality rule in single-member districts. Proportional representation, particularly in large multi-member 
districts, deteriorates budget outcomes because the electoral rule increases the likelihood of more fragmented 
legislatures and coalition governments. Following Tullock (1959), fragmented legislatures induce fiscal imbalances 
because individual claimants cannot be held entirely responsible for the problems associated to a deteriorating 
budget. To the extent that the benefits from spending accrue to each claimant, while the costs are spread over all 
members in the coalition, spending transfers increase and fiscal deficits emerge regardless the countercyclical 
purpose of fiscal policy. As a result, in the long run, government debt tends to be excessively high (Velasco, 2000, 
pp. 108-109). Briefly, electoral systems of proportional representation are likely to induce deteriorating budgets 
because the electoral formula increases the likelihood that a “problem of the commons” in fiscal policy will develop. 
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enables local government officials to tailor programs, taxes and expenditures in order to attract 
household and businesses who vote with their feet (Musgrave, 1959, 1999; Oates, 1972, 1977, 
Elazar, 1987, Weingast, 1995). To the extent that households and businesses are free to make 
their own residential location decisions, federalism creates the right incentives for local 
politicians to learn and respond to the heterogeneous demands of the local communities.
24
 
 
2.2.1. Policy Responsiveness: The Role of Candidate Selection 
  
 A research topic largely overlooked by the political economy literature, this section 
examines the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party candidate nomination 
methods are crucial if we want to understand the politicians’ representation efforts.25 The 
positive stance is simple: Aspirants to party tickets, either newcomers or incumbents interested 
on reelection, must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add their names to 
the electoral ballot.  
 In democratic regimes, political parties have long remained the main gatekeepers in the 
process of candidate recruitment for public office above organized interest groups, donors and 
the media (Norris, 1996, p.192). In a context of legal constraints, intra-party rules, informal 
conventions and even traditions, candidate selection within parties may develop in several 
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 However, the economic effects of federalism are still under debate. Oates (1972) contends that jurisdictions 
competing with each other for taxpayers may lead to suboptimal taxation, hence underprovision of public goods. 
Treisman (1999) shows that failure to coordinate economic policy across levels of government leads to fiscal 
indiscipline and macroeconomic instability. Wibbels (2001) find evidence that higher subnational spending and 
deficits lead to larger deficits at the national level. 
 
25
 The political parties’ methods of candidate selection may be more influential at shaping the workings of 
democratic systems than previous studies on democratic responsiveness have implied up today. Sartori (1976), 
Schlesinger (1991) and Katz (2001) identify candidate nomination procedures as a defining characteristic of political 
parties in democratic regimes. For Bille (2001), a political regime ought to be classified as democratic only if it 
provides for the institutional mechanisms advancing public influence and participation within political parties. 
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dimensions. Following Norris (1996), nomination decisions may be open to a large group 
beyond party membership or limited to the participation of party members. Nomination 
processes may be open to public scrutiny or carried out in privately held meetings. Candidate 
nomination decisions may also be centralized by a small number of influential party members or 
dispersed across party branches. Key selection groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, 
registered voters, grassroots party members, delegates at regional or national party conventions, 
regional officers, factions, affiliated interest groups, or national party leaders (p. 206). 
 Concerning policy responsiveness, whose preferences impact actual policy depends on 
who governs intra-party nomination decisions. Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer (1966), Jupp 
(1968) and Ranney (1981) place the locus of power within political parties on those choosing 
party nominees for electoral contestation from among the pool of eligibles. The logic of their 
argument is straight and simple: Aspirants to party tickets must first respond to the demands of 
those with the power to add their names to the electoral ballot or face the threat of losing party 
nomination. While studying the Indian Congress Party, Weiner (1967) notices that candidate 
nomination decisions on the hands of the national party oligarchy party make contenders to party 
tickets willing to advocate the immediate concerns and national policies of party leadership (pp. 
48-49). For Chaube (2003), the potential denial of re-nomination is the key element to 
understand the conformity of a member of the legislature with the wishes of those making 
nomination decisions. Even elected officials must answer to the party gatekeepers’ demands or 
face the threat of losing party nomination at the time of the next election (p. 212). Hence, 
together with the power to select party nominees, key selection groups greatly influence the 
incumbents’ representation efforts.  
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 Amongst the different dimensions in which intra-party candidate selection may develop, 
increased participation and democratization of the nomination process enhances policy 
responsiveness. Democratic and inclusive candidate selection refers to the meaningful 
involvement of the mass public and participation of the party membership in the process of 
selecting candidates for general elections (Sartori, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hazan, 2002, p. 117). 
Following Norris (1996), key nomination groups may then comprise enfranchised citizens, 
registered voters, grassroots party members and democratically elected delegates at regional or 
national party conventions in which nominees are selected by democratic means (p. 203).  
 For instance, in his classic book Congress: The Electoral Connection David Mayhew 
[1974] develops the case that mandatory party primaries turn incumbents in the U.S. Congress 
particularly receptive to the demands of their electoral constituencies, often at the point of 
challenging the directives of the national party leadership. This happens because the initial step 
in the process of electing a new legislature corresponds to that of achieving party nomination -
i.e., access to the electoral ballot. Inclusive-democratic candidate selection then places 
potentially large selection groups as the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new legislature. 
Moreover, in Mayhew’s view, party primaries facilitate the incumbents’ arduous task of 
responding to the demands of the party’s grassroots members while representing the interests of 
the electoral constituency as the policy preferences of a large selection group draw near to those 
of the electoral constituency. For reasons of political survival, incumbents choose policies and 
assume stances and attitudes that resemble those of the median member in the selection group 
and the electoral constituency. As a result, in the US Congress, legislating and voting in 
accordance to the perceptions of their constituencies and identification and fulfillment of their 
communities’ needs greatly improves the incumbent’s opportunities of re-nomination and 
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electoral success (Downs, 1957; Mayhew, 1974). Briefly, because newcomers and incumbents 
seeking reelection must achieve access to the electoral ballot before every election, increasing 
inclusiveness and democratization of the nomination process turn aspirants to party tickets eager 
to respond to the demands of the enfranchised.
 26
 
 In contrast, away from democratic practices, monopolization of the candidate nomination 
decisions by the few hinders policy responsiveness. Centralized selection methods imply 
substantial levels of participation and command from oligarchic party elites such as national 
party leaderships, regional executives, affiliated groups, and faction leaders (Norris, 1996, p. 
203). Even if legislative reelection is a de facto alternative, party oligarchies controlling 
nomination decisions cause newcomers and incumbents to favor party guidelines over their 
constituencies’ interests. Otherwise, incumbents would face the threat of losing party nomination 
and newcomers would find themselves in faulty conditions to become serious contenders for 
party nomination (Gallagher, 1988b; Hazan, 1999, 2002). Moreover, the candidates’ propensity 
to be responsive to the party leadership correlates with their ambition to pursue long-run careers 
in the political arena. Politicians will eventually need the support of their political parties in order 
to further their careers in either the legislative or the executive branch, at the local, state, or 
federal levels of government. 
 If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of economic progress 
and policy frameworks as mindful choices, then researchers’ efforts ought to expose the policy-
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 Even though democratization and geographic decentralization of the nomination decisions may be related 
phenomena, it is democratic inclusiveness of the intra-party selection process the key to understand the politicians’ 
incentive to remain political responsive to wide-encompassing interests. It is inclusiveness and massification of the 
candidate recruitment process that truly define a democratic process of candidate selection (Hazan, 2002, p. 117). If 
nomination decisions are delegated to local party bosses, decentralization of the nomination decisions does not 
imply higher levels of intra-party democracy neither the encouragement of policy responsiveness. For instance, the 
scholarly literature authenticate the occurrence of elite-centered candidate selection within parties and decentralized 
party structures in countries such as Argentina (Jones, 2002; De Luca, Jones, & Tula, 2002), Brazil (Figueiredo & 
Limongi, 2000), and Mexico (Story, 1992; Camp, 1993; Lujambio, 1998). 
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makers’ motives. The methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general 
elections greatly vary across nations and across political parties within nations. However, if the 
focal point is the occurrence or absence of a democratic process in the intra-party nomination 
methods, categorization of contemporary electoral states by having or not a politically responsive 
national assembly suggests an economic difference as well as a difference in the quality of 
democracy supplied by the countries’ political systems. In the developed world, candidate 
nomination within political parties appears largely informed by inclusive and democratic 
practices. In contrast, in the less-developed world events of intraparty participatory politics are 
for the most part absent, with nomination decisions often monopolized by national party leaders 
and local party bosses. The economic effects as well as the political consequences of candidate 
selection are identified as subjects deserving closer scrutiny.  
 The political economy literature often stresses differences in political institutions in order 
to explain policy choices, growth and development. While political scientists have long 
recognized the relevance of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for 
general elections, the economic effects of candidate selection have attracted much less 
consideration from researchers in the field of political economy. The following section adds to 
the scholarly literature by formalizing the connection between the degree of participation and 
democratization of the methods employed by political parties to select candidates for general 
elections and the adoption of characteristic policy frameworks, then growth and development. 
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2.3. The Formal Approach to the Economic Effects of Policy Responsiveness 
 
 The literature dealing with the issue of political responsiveness in electoral states 
traditionally emphasizes the agency problems implied by the principle of democratic 
representation. Voters, the principals, look at elected officials as agents. Limited and asymmetric 
information, weak monitoring and incomplete contracts create the potential for opportunistic 
behavior from the part of the agents. The existence of principal-agent and asymmetric 
information problems may then be conducive to a status of poor democratic representation where 
politicians could be adopting positions contrary to those that would be pursued if voters were 
fully informed. 
 Even though the striking implications that the existence of agency problems have on 
democratic representation, the orthodox approach treats policy responsiveness as a secondary 
outcome of a process in which politicians trade off campaign resources for representation efforts 
of narrow interests that regular voters disprove. Incumbents respond to the unpopular demands of 
donors provided that the benefits obtained from campaign resources to reach the less informed 
voters exceed the loss of electoral support from the informed voters (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1987; 
Bailey, 2004; Baron, 1994; Bawn & Thies, 2003; Clawson, Neustadtl, & Weller, 1998; Denzau 
& Munger, 1986; Grossman & Helpman, 2001; Prat, 2002). 
 Moreover, implicit in the literature on money and politics is the assumption that 
politicians are benevolent agents whose judgment becomes impaired by the demands of 
campaign contributors. This perspective on the role of donors to political campaigns implies that 
institutional frameworks preventing any role to money in political campaigns would maximize 
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the politicians’ response to the interests of the whole. However, if we admit the role of 
institutions as determinants of the politicians’ behavior and policy choices, the lack of incentives 
for politicians to act responsive to the narrow interests does not imply higher democratic 
responsiveness. Even in the absence of incentives to look after narrow concerns, the incumbents’ 
equilibrium behavior may not favor the quality of democratic representation. 
 Furthermore, the literature dealing with the issue of campaign contributions and 
democratic representation usually deems reelection as the relevant institutional mechanism for 
politicians to act responsive to the demands of the unorganized group of regular voters. It is the 
reelection mechanism that also predisposes politicians to skew policy towards those choices 
preferred by narrow interests in exchange for campaign contributions and resources that may 
help the incumbent to stay in office. Lately, however, the scholarly literature has evolved to 
acknowledge the effects that several political institutions have on the politicians’ propensity to 
represent the broader interests through the policy-making process. For instance, the process of 
running for public office, in general, and that of electing a new legislature, in particular, usually 
starts by achieving party nomination. The fact that contenders for public office must achieve 
access to the electoral ballot before every election suggests that the intra-party nomination 
methods impact the politician’s representation efforts and policy choices once in office. The 
following section shall address these issues in greater detail. 
 
2.3.1. A Simple Model of Policy Responsiveness with Candidate Selection 
 
 This section formalizes the notion that the incentives provided by the intra-party 
candidate nomination methods are crucial in order to understand the politicians’ representation 
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efforts, the incumbent’s policy choices and economic outcomes. Expressly, newcomers and 
incumbents seeking reelection must first respond to the demands of those with the power to add 
their names to the electoral ballot. Consequently, increasing participation and democratization of 
the intra-party nomination processes has a positive effect on the incumbent’s propensity to 
represent the interests of the whole and adopt policies that favor economic affluence. In contrast, 
elite-centered nomination methods decrease the incumbent’s propensity to respond to the 
interests of the whole in favor of the representation of narrow interests that often demand 
policies that benefit the group at the expense of overall economic growth. 
 The initial motivation is to assess the sensitiveness of members of national assemblies to 
represent wide-encompassing interests through the policy-making process. Special attention is 
paid to the distinctive efforts of members of congress. By institutional design, in democratic 
regimes the legislators’ choices define, for the most part, actual public policy. Even though the 
actual process of policy-making greatly varies across countries (Lijphart, 1984, 1989, 1991, 
1999), legislative outcomes largely determine the countries’ economic and social policies. In 
today’s democratic world, legislative consent by national assemblies regularly precedes the stage 
of governmental action. 
 The model builds on Denzau and Munger’s (1986) constrained maximization model of 
money and politics. The authors model the decision dilemma that U.S. legislators face if seeking 
reelection. Rational, self-interested incumbents allocate their representation efforts to both, 
organized pressure groups that supply campaign resources and regular voters who supply the 
necessary votes to keep the incumbent in office. Denzau and Munger show that the policy 
preferences of the growth-oriented regular voters limit the legislator’s willingness to represent 
the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups. Incumbents respond to the donors’ 
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unpopular demands only if the benefits attained from the contributors’ resources to reach the 
less-informed voters exceed the loss of electoral support from more-informed voters. 
 
2.3.1.1. The Agents 
 
 The legislator’s decision problem is one of effort allocation to represent the demands of 
interest groups, EI; the demands of those in the political party with the power to add the 
incumbent’s name to the electoral ballot before every election, EP, and the demands of the 
unorganized group of voters at the general election, EU. As in Denzau and Munger (1986), 
“effort is simply the amount of the legislator's time, the time spent by staff, and the amount of 
office resources a legislator allocates to an activity, and Ē is the total amount of effort he has 
available to allocate (p. 93).”  
 
2.3.1.2. The Single Legislator’s Problem if Inclusive-Democratic Candidate Selection 
 
 Consider the case of an incumbent interested on reelection. Suppose the electoral rule is 
such that incumbents must achieve party nomination before every election in a party primary 
decided by plurality rule. Assume interest groups only care about EI; regular voters care about 
EU and EI ; and party supporters at the party primary care about EP, EU and EI. Explicitly, donors 
supply campaign resources, R, to the legislator in exchange for representation efforts of their 
narrow concerns. Incumbents may then use campaign resources R to reach the less-informed 
voters before the next election. Regular voters at the district election care merely about the 
maximum level of welfare available and the actual state of the economy, hence disapprove the 
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incumbent’s efforts to represent the demands of interest groups that often extract resources from 
the economy and reduce welfare.
27
 Party supporters, as a subset of the more encompassing group 
of regular voters, care about the general state of the economy as well as the incumbent’s stances 
on salient issues other than the economy and disprove the incumbent’s representation efforts of 
narrow concerns. 
 Assuming legislators care only about reelection and allocate their efforts to maximize the 
votes received at the next election, the single incumbent’s vote share function at the district 
election is: 
 
V=VD{(p/ē)EU(EP), EI , R(EI)} 
 
Where 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
  
   
   
   
 The legislator’s representation efforts to the demands of the district electorate are a 
function of his/her efforts to represent the demands of participants at the party primary, EU(EP). 
Because the initial step in the process of running for public office is that of achieving party 
nomination, participants at the party primary are the gatekeepers in the process of electing a new 
                                                          
27
 Much of the economic-voting literature supports the view that the state of economy plays a meaningful role when 
electors decide whom to support. Jacobson (1990) show that in the US, economic performance is inversely 
correlated to legislative turnover. Kramer (1971), Hibbing and Alford (1981) and Kiewiet (1983) show that electors 
deem U.S. representatives of the incumbent government responsible for the state of the economy. Researchers have 
also shown that legislative professionalism fails to insulate legislative elections in the U.S. from the effects of the 
national economic conditions (Chubb, 1988) and economic shocks (Chubb, 1988; Hibbing, 1999). In addition to the 
U.S., evidence of economic voting has been noted in Canada (Johnston, Blais, Brady, & Crête, 1992), France 
(Lafay, 1991), Germany (Kirchgässner, 1991; Goergen & Norpoth, 1992; Anderson, 1995) and the U.K. (Studlar, 
McAllister, & Ascui, 1990; Norpoth, 1992). 
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legislature. Reelection-seekers must first be responsive to the demands of the party gatekeepers 
in order to ensure at least a relative majority in the primary election. Alternatively, contenders 
ignoring the demands of participants at the party primary, (EP=0), are denied nomination. 
Together with the denial of re-nomination, incumbents lose the power to represent the demands 
of the district constituency (EU=0). Consequently, incumbents cannot be responsive to the 
district electorate without first being responsive to the demands of party supporters at the party 
primary. 
 Moreover, increasing participation and democratization of the nomination process 
facilitates the incumbent’s task of effort allocation and representation. Let (p/ē) € (0,1) 
characterize the fraction of voters in the district election that participate as well in the party 
primary. Considering the number of district voters fixed at least for the next election, (p/ē) can be 
regarded as an indirect measure of the ideological distance between the median voter at the 
general election and the median voter of the necessarily smaller group of party supporters at the 
primary election. As p0, only those party supporters with intense political views are likely to 
participate in the party primary. As pē, (p/ē)1 meaning that the primary constituency comes 
to resemble the district constituency. To the extent that the primary election is sufficiently 
inclusive and decided by democratic means, the incumbent’s representation efforts to the median 
party supporter are likely to please the median voter at the district level (Mayhew, 1974). 
 The incumbent’s problem is to find the optimal allocation of effort that maximizes his/her 
chances to stay in office. Formally: 
 
    Max V = VD{(p/ē)EU(EP), EI , R(EI)}  subject to   EP + EU + EI = Ē  
EP,EU, EI 
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 As in Denzau and Munger (1986), the first-order conditions can be rearranged to give the 
legislator’s supply price for servicing narrow interests: 
 
  
   
                       
  
 
  
   
   
   
    
   
     
   
  
      
  
 The legislator’s supply price is always positive given (p/ē) € (0,1) and ∂VD/∂EI < 0.  The 
party supporters’ participation rate at the primary election is key in order to understand the 
legislator’s representation efforts once in office. The amount of resources needed to persuade an 
incumbent to represent narrow concerns is increasing with the level of participation of party 
supporters at the primary election. Party supporters at the primary election are just a subset of the 
district electorate and increasing efforts to represent the unpopular demands of interest groups 
reduces the incumbent’s prospects to win both, the party primary and the district election.  
 Consider the case in which pē. This implies (p/ē)1 and ∂EU/∂EP1. If party 
primaries are sufficiently inclusive and carried out by democratic means, the policy preferences 
and political stances of members of the party at the ground will resemble those of the general 
electorate (Mayhew, 1974). Clearly, the legislator’s supply price reaches its maximum from the 
term  
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
  with  p = ē, and any decrease in the participation rate at the primary election 
reduces the amount of resources needed to convince an incumbent to represent the demands of 
interest groups. If p = ē, the legislator looks at party supporters and the group of regular voters as 
a single constituency and his/her vote share function becomes that of Denzau and Munger 
(1986), V = VD(EU, EI, R(EI)). Consequently, the model of legislative behavior presented in this 
section anticipates more representation of narrow concerns from the part of incumbents than that 
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predicted by Denzau and Munger (1986) because instances of relatively small participation at primary 
elections in comparison to district elections are by far the rule rather than the exception. 
 Briefly, only contenders prioritizing the demands of party supporters at primary elections 
will have their names added to the electoral ballot. If reelection is a political purpose, successful 
incumbents must be responsive to the demands of both, supporters at the primary election and 
regular voters at the district election. Because participants at the primary election are just a 
subset of the more encompassing group of regular voters at the district election, increasing 
participation and democratization of the nomination process favors the adoption of growth-
enhancing policies. This happens because the citizenry looks at the state of the economy in order 
to decide whom to support. As a corollary, increasing participation and democratization of the 
nomination process increase the amount of resources needed to persuade an incumbent to 
represent the often growth-retarding demands of interest groups that regular voters disprove. 
 
2.3.1.3. The Single Legislator’s Problem if Elite-Centered Candidate Selection 
 
 Consider the alternative case in which, in the absence of a democratic process, 
nomination decisions are monopolized by party leaders. If elite-centered candidate selection, 
then party discipline becomes perhaps the legislator’s most valuable political asset in order to 
achieve party nomination. Contenders must prioritize the party platform, guidelines and demands 
of the party leadership or face the threat of losing party nomination. Consequently, the 
legislator’s representation efforts to the demands of regular voters are now conditional to the 
demands of the party oligarchy making nomination decisions.  
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 Formally, nomination decisions on the hands of the few imply p = 0 because party rules 
deny party supporters any role in the selection of candidates for legislative contestation. Given 
that (p/ē) = 0 and  
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
 = 0, the legislator’s supply price becomes: 
 
  
   
                 
 
   
   
   
  
            
   
   
      
  
 The fact that contenders to party tickets do not have to please party supporters but 
members of the party oligarchy in order to have their names added to the electoral ballot has 
important consequences on the incumbents’ representation efforts. First, as noted in the previous 
section, if inclusive-democratic candidate selection, the amount of resources needed to persuade 
an incumbent to represent narrow interests reaches its maximum when the party primary 
constituency resembles the district electorate. Any decrease in the participation rate of party 
supporters at the primary election decreases the incumbent’s supply price. Under elite-centered 
candidate selection, the legislator’s supply price reaches its minimum implying that the 
incumbent’s propensity to represent narrow concerns is now at its maximum. Overtly, elite-
centered candidate selection favors the representation of the often growth-retarding demands of 
interest groups through the policy-making process: 
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 Second, elite-centered candidate selection facilitates to interest groups the otherwise 
more complicated task of having their demands represented through the policy-making process. 
Clearly, nomination decisions on the hands of the few reduce the transaction costs incurred by 
interests groups in search for representation efforts. Instead of engaging in the arduous task of 
building a coalition of incumbents willing to represent their narrow concerns, special interests 
may now negotiate directly with a clearly identifiable small group of part leaders. In exchange 
for representation efforts, interest groups may now contribute campaign resources to the party 
elite, knowing that incumbents must comply with the demands of the party leadership or face the 
threat of losing party nomination at the time of the next election. 
 Third, nominated candidates still need to win the, perhaps competitive, district election. 
However, the incumbent’s capacity to answer to the demands of regular voters is limited by the 
legislator’s representation efforts to the party leadership that she/he must prioritize in order to 
win party nomination. Under conditions of limited representation capabilities to increase his/her 
district’s vote share, campaign contributions grow to be decisive for the incumbent’s political 
survival. Even though politicians’ reliance on pork-barrel politics across modern electoral states 
is well documented, in countries where nomination decisions are under the control of the 
national party or local party bosses the exploits of clientelism and patronage acquire a pervasive 
role. For instance, evidence of politicians’ systematic reliance on pork-barrel politics has been 
noted by the scholarly literature across a number of countries in Africa (e.g., Bates, 1982; 
Bratton & van de Walle, 1994; Wantchekon, 2003) and Latin America (e.g., Ames, 2001; 
Benton, 2007; Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Mainwaring, 1999; Martz, 1997). 
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 One important question must be addressed: If we acknowledge party leaders interested on 
electoral success, why don’t be politically responsive to the interests of the electoral constituency 
beyond pork-barrel politics? Away from a democratic process and intra-party participatory 
politics, nomination decisions monopolized by party leaders turn incumbents exceptionally 
receptive to the demands of the party leadership. To all appearances, aside political platforms, 
unearthing the policy preferences and demands of party leaders becomes an essential task. A 
meaningful analysis, however, must address the institutional conditions in which the actual 
policy-making process is carried out if we want to know who gets represented. The next chapter 
develops the case and provides supportive evidence that elite-centered candidate selection plays 
a major role enabling executives to implement her/his preferred policies. Executive prevalence 
then limits the capacity of party leaders in the governing coalition to use policy beyond 
clientelism and patronage for electoral gains. 
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Chapter 3 
Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executives Prevalence:  
Evidence from Fiscal Policy in Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 “…All in all for a democratic people to lodge powers in an elective executive is a risky 
business (p. 174).” Mayhew, D. R. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
 
 Undeniably, sound policy is common knowledge. Despite the politico-institutional 
environment and the incentives it may create, political leaders may choose to commit to 
strategies that promote economic affluence at any time. However, if we consent to the generally 
accepted view of institutions as growth determinants, the lack of incentives for politicians to act 
responsive to the interests of the whole may lead to detrimental economic outcomes.  
 This chapter sets out to investigate the effects that term limits have on the politicians’ 
policy choices and the role that, in democratic regimes, elite-centered candidate selection play as 
a determinant of the politicians’ ability to implement their preferred policies. This chapter’s 
thesis is as follows: elite-centered candidate selection plays a meaningful role placing executives 
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in an advantageous position to further his/her preferences over policy. This chapter then uses 
fiscal policy as the policy of choice to exemplify what the detrimental effects of executive 
prevalence and executive term limits are on fiscal outcomes in Latin America. Beyond the 
confines of the Latin American region, the approach pursued in this chapter may also provide 
partial explanation for the current fiscal distress experienced by Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal; all countries where nomination decisions, away from democratic practices, are 
monopolized by party leaders. 
 
3.1. Executive Prevalence: Evidence from Fiscal Policy  
 
 From an institutional standpoint a variety of motives can drive fiscal outcomes.
28
 
Recently, the literature has evolved to study the politicians’ behavior and their policy choices 
according to the reputation building model of politics. In an attempt to study electoral cycles and 
fiscal cycles, Rogoff (1990) constructs a model based on a forward looking electorate that 
receives signals from politicians that is indicative of their ability to govern. Rogoff’s seminal 
work points to the notion that politicians’ incentive to establish a reputation and/or signal 
through the use of public policy can have important outcomes. Only those politicians who desire 
to run for office must maintain a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic 
policy among constituents. If establishing a reputation matters for future political purposes, fiscal 
policies can be important signals to voters and politicians’ incentive to signal through the use of 
                                                          
28
 Scholars have paid close attention to the effects of various political institutions to fiscal discipline. According to 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) public debt is typically used by each government to influence the choices of its 
successors. Perrson and Svensson (1989) find that conservatives run fiscal deficits in order to constrain the spending 
choices of the elected official, especially if they know a liberal candidate will take office. Federalism is another 
factor that may contribute to the successes or failures of macroeconomic stabilization and reform. Treisman (1999) 
shows that failure to coordinate economic policy across levels of government leads to fiscal indiscipline and 
macroeconomic instability; Wibbels (2001) find evidence that higher subnational spending and deficits lead to larger 
deficits at the national level. 
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fiscal spending and taxation can have important outcomes. In Rogoff’s view, keeping spending 
and tax rates down requires an effort from the part of politicians who pursue these reputation-
enhancing policies under the prospect of reelection. This happens because future electoral 
prospects create an incentive for politicians to build their reputations with this forward looking 
electorate who may be judging performance based on these signals. In contrast, increases in 
spending and higher tax rates occur during the incumbent’s last term because a good reputation 
in these matters will be of no use for the politician’s future political purposes.  
 Although Rogoff’s (1990) proposition has not been subject of extensive research, the 
available empirical studies examining fiscal decisions of chief executives find robust support to 
the view that the imposition of term limits in office of executives alters the incumbent’s 
behavior.
 29
 Besley and Case’s (1995) work was the first to test the reputation-building model on 
fiscal policy across 48 American states, 1950 to 1986. Taking into consideration the factors that 
could possibly weaken the relationship of term limits and fiscal policy, they control for party 
loyalty, lack of gubernatorial discretion, and life after governorship. Their results suggest that 
these other factors are not “strong enough to rein in governors whose days are numbered (p. 
775).” The authors find that gubernatorial term limits increase both total government spending 
and tax rates. Gubernatorial lame-duck periods appear associated to increases in total state 
spending and receipts in the form of sales, income, corporate, and total taxes, particularly when a 
Democrat holds office. Their results also indicate that spending and taxes were lower in the first 
term in two term-limit states. Rose (2006) extends Besley and Case’s (1995) study to examine 
the effect of fiscal institutions across the American states and found that only in states with strict 
                                                          
29
 If testing the effect of term limits on the incumbent’s choice between alternative policies, legislative bodies 
constitute a poor laboratory. In a country sample of 68 electoral states only four nations banned legislative reelection 
since WWII: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Philippines. Ecuador changed its policy to allow for legislative 
reelection in 1996 and the Philippines allows up to three consecutive legislative terms since 1987. 
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prohibitions on deficit carry-overs, neither gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition 
of government appear to significantly affect state government expenditures and revenue.   
 Having established some empirical validity to the importance of executive term limits on 
fiscal spending and taxation across American states, Besley and Case’s (1995) study provide the 
groundwork for expanding the study of term limits to other institutional settings. Johnson and 
Crain (2004) utilize Besley and Case’s (1995) model to study executive term limits among 48 
democracies. The authors find substantial evidence of increasing levels of fiscal spending and tax 
revenue in democracies with one term limit rule. Government spending grew systematically in 
countries under single-term rule in comparison to two-term limits or no term limits at all. In 
addition, countries operating under two-term limits suffered significantly from fiscal volatility 
though they do not experience a significant increase in government spending over time. Under 
two-term limits rule, executives also spent more and increased taxes during the lame-duck 
period.  
 Although in short supply, the available empirical literature corroborates Rogoff’s (1990) 
contention that the imposition of term limits alters the behavior of executives, discouraging 
political accountability and policy responsiveness, and precluding the adoption of reputation-
enhancing policies. This raises important questions of how executives, in particular those in 
institutional regimes of division of powers, seem persistently successful in the arduous tasks of 
building a coalition, preserving the alliance’s cohesiveness and ostensibly leading the budgetary 
process despite a likely environment of multi-party politics and periods of divided government.
30
  
 
 
                                                          
30
 Empirical evidence supports the notion of coalition-building executives. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) 
notice that between 1946 and 1999 coalition governments under presidentialism formed in more than half of the 
cases in which official parties did not hold a majority in the legislature. 
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3.2. The Problem of Effective Governance  
 
 In democratic regimes, executives regularly retain a wide degree of latitude in 
implementing policy. Executives often have the ability to introduce legislation in many policy 
areas, veto powers, amendatory observations faculties (positive veto) that allows executives to 
add provisions to legislation and decree powers. All these institutional faculties, where available, 
give substantial control to the executive in the area of fiscal policy. However, effective 
governance requires congressional support to pass laws. For an elected government, building and 
preserving a coalition are perhaps the most important tasks in order to attain governability and 
lead the policy-making process. 
 In parliamentary regimes, the executive has to accommodate the demands of coalition 
members in order to form government and stay in office. The problem of attaining governability 
may be particularly challenging in systems of division of powers. In presidential systems, 
executives act unhindered by coalition demands in order to stay in office. Independently elected 
branches and fixed mandates may hamper cooperation, discourage the formation of coalitions 
and increase the likelihood of legislative impasses (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Ricciuti, 
2004). 
 Regardless the political regime, executives habitually bargain with congressional 
representatives in order to attain governability. Following Mainwaring (1993), executives 
looking for support to their programs rely frequently on patronage to induce coalition formation 
and coalition cohesiveness. Bueno de Mezquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) advance 
the Selectorate Theory. The Selectorate Theory maintains that leaders who seek the support of a 
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small coalition often favor the use of private rewards that only benefit coalition members. Those 
who require the support of a large coalition favor the supply of public goods, rather than private 
benefits, in order to reward their supporters. Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) show that 
executives have an incentive to make coalition offers and party leaders to accept these offers 
once parties are assumed to care about offices and policies in addition to government founds. 
Following the authors, parties and party leaders must care about offices and policies because 
parties accrue influence and benefits from the programs and policies carried out by the 
government. In support of the notion that government ministries matter for parties and party 
leaders in the coalition, Gamson (1961) anticipate that parties forming government should each 
get a number of ministries that reflects the share of seats they bring to the coalition (p. 376); a 
statement known as Gamson’s Law. In a cross-country cross-section study of parliamentary 
governments, 1997-2005, Carroll and Cox (2007) find evidence in support of Gamson’s Law in 
governments based on pre-election pacts. The authors also find support in favor of Gamson’s 
Law in a sample of Western European governments, 1945-2000. In the Latin American context, 
Geddes (1994) tests forty-four presidential terms via the development of Appointment and 
Survival Strategy Indices. The author concludes that executives take steps to increase state 
capacity using funding as well as appointment strategies and the assistance of the bureaucracy to 
gain the support of elite party organizers. Briefly, this strand of the literature underlines the idea 
that executives can rely on pork-barrel politics, policy concessions and the resources of the 
public administration to gain the support of party leaders, increase state capacity and achieve 
governability. 
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3.3. A Simple Reciprocity Model of Coalition Bargaining with Executive Prevalence and 
       Elite-Centered Candidate Selection 
  
 This section introduces an alternative view to the process of coalition bargaining and 
cohesiveness. Informal reciprocity norms, the threat of ostracism from the governing coalition 
and the practice of elite-centered candidate selection facilitate coalition formation and coalition 
cohesiveness and put the executive in an advantageous position to further his/her preferred 
policies.  
 The model builds on the work of Borcherding and Filson (2002) who provide formal 
conditions under which people who consume in groups use informal reciprocity norms in 
preference to a price system. The authors show that informal reciprocity agreements are more 
likely to arise in groups where potential partners are sufficiently patient, members of the group 
are likely to continue to interact, the time between interactions is short, and the group is small 
and homogeneous (p. 239). 
 
3.3.1. The Agents 
 
 Consider an elected executive who coalesce with a number of party leaders in the 
legislature to form government and/or increase state capacity. The executive has unambiguous 
preferences over policy. As per Rogoff (990), elected officials care about their reputations if 
running for reelection. Fiscal policy is one important way in which reelection seeking executives 
signal their ability to govern to voters.  Concerning fiscal policy, we anticipate reelection seeking 
executives to further their efforts to keep government spending and tax rates down because a 
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good reputation in these matters increases their chances to stay in office. This happens because 
voters use both past performance as well as the expectation of future performance of contenders 
for office to decide whom to support.  
 In contrast, executives in their last term have no incentives to pursue reputation-
enhancing policies since their efforts will not be rewarded with an additional term in office. 
Binding term limits, for instance, create fewer incentives for reputation building because the 
electoral rule eliminates the capacity of the electorate to reward politicians’ past performance 
with reelection (Grofman, 1996; Doron & Harris, 2001). In line with Rogoff’s (1990) reputation-
building model of political behavior, we presume lame-duck executives to exert less effort to 
keep spending and taxes down since a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for the 
incumbent’s future political purposes. 
 Consider now the group of party leaders in the legislature. Party leaders are concerned, 
above all, about political survival; hence interested on their parties’ electoral success and 
vulnerable to intra-party competition. Party leaders accrue benefits from public funds, ministries, 
policy concessions and access to the resources of the public administration that strengthen their 
leadership within their parties. At any time, party leaders pursue public funds, legislation and 
concessions that give him/her an amount of resources that is at least equivalent to his/her 
reservation value; i.e. the minimum amount of resources considered necessary by the party 
leader to ensure political survival. Consequently, a rational self-interested party leader concerned 
with political survival has an incentive to negotiate his/her coalition membership and accept the 
executive’s offer if this offer matches, at least, the party leader’s reservation value. 
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3.3.2. The Single Party Leader’s Problem 
 
 Consider a scenario in which a group of n party leaders in the legislature and the 
executive study the prospect of coalescing to form government. Assuming that all party leaders 
are identical, party leader i solves the following utility maximization problem: 
 
Max V(x) - c(x) - T*n  
  x   
 
where x denotes the executive’s offer to party leader i that the executive extends with the aim to 
gain the party leader’s support to the policies of the government in office. Explicitly, x represents 
the pooled amount of a composed good of public funds, resources of the public administration, 
positions in the bureaucracy, policy concessions and/or government programs. V(x) represents 
the benefits in dollars that party leader i accrue from x. Assume V(x) is strictly monotonic 
increasing in x. Since x is a composed good, party leader i cares more about the aggregate dollar 
benefits accrued from V(x) than the specific combination of the basket, x.
31
 Alternatively, there 
is always a number of different baskets x that yield equal dollar values to the party leader. 
 Party leaders are concerned about political survival. In democratic regimes, party leaders 
work through the uncertainties associated to electoral and intra-party competition. To account for 
this, political vulnerability enters the party leader’s decision problem in the form of a cost 
function, c(x). Because access to more resources strengthens the leadership position of party 
                                                          
31
 The reader may consider a variation of the class of additively separable preferences V(x) = Σn un(xn). An 
additively separable utility function on all commodities allows focusing on a group of commodities. This variant, 
however, complicates the analysis and does not add much to the point of executives tailoring baskets to the needs of 
individual party leaders in order to induce coalition formation and coalition cohesiveness. 
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leader i within his/her party as well as the party’s electoral prospects, c(x) is decreasing and 
unbound in x. Hence, party leader i’s efforts will be directed to capture as much resources as 
possible through the coalition bargaining process, even above the party leader’s reservation 
value, x . 
 Transaction costs (T) enter in the form of bargaining costs for party leader i to negotiate 
with the executive and other members in the coalition concessions and resources. The intra-party 
candidate nomination methods may then have a substantial impact on coalition bargaining costs. 
Specifically, away from democratic practices, nomination decisions monopolized by oligarchic 
party elites reduce negotiation costs as well as strengthen the party leader’s position as an 
effective negotiator. In regard to candidate selection, researchers have long placed the locus of 
political authority and control within political parties on the hands of those making nomination 
decisions. Following Norris (1996) and Hazan (2002), if elite-centered candidate selection, then 
contenders for party nomination must adhere to the directives of the party leadership. Otherwise, 
newcomers would find themselves in faulty conditions to achieve party nomination and 
incumbents would face the potential denial of re-nomination.
32
 Overtly, intra-party nomination 
decisions on the hands of the few reduce coalition bargaining costs by two means. They remove 
the need for the executive and party leaders to negotiate with members of the legislature on an 
individual basis. Elite-centered candidate selection also enables party leaders as effective 
negotiators with the strength to enforce coalition agreements in the legislature.   
                                                          
32
 Elite-centered nomination methods are common across electoral states in Africa. In Latin America, national party 
leaders, regional party bosses, or leaders of intraparty factions monopolize, on a regular basis, candidate selection 
decisions for legislative elections (Jones & Hwang, 2005, p. 267). For a more detailed examination of the methods 
employed by political parties in Latin America to select candidates for general elections see Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995), Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) and Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008). Weiner (1967, pp. 48-49) and Chaube 
(2003, p. 212) develop a similar case in order to explain the high levels of party discipline observed by MP’s in the 
Indian congress. In Southern Europe, researchers have noticed elite-centered candidate selection across parties in 
government in Greece (Gallagher, 1988a; Kohler, 1982), Italy (Bardi & Morlino, 1994; Wertman, 1988), Portugal 
(Colomer, 1996) and Spain (Colomer, 1996; Lundell, 2004). 
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 Unlike party leaders in the legislature, chief executives are interested in the composition 
of the basket of resources x. In line with Rogoff (1990), politicians interested on reelection have 
an incentive to build a reputation of political responsiveness and responsible economic policy 
with an electorate that looks at these signals in order to decide whom to support at the time of the 
next election. Fiscal policy is one important way in which chief executives signal their ability to 
govern. In order to keep spending and taxes down, a reputation-building executive offers to party 
leader i a basket x that relies primarily on policy concessions, ministries and/or access to the 
resources of the public administration, instead of merely public funds. Formally, if running for 
reelection, political vulnerability enters the executive’s decision problem in the form of a 
quadratic cost function c(x) initially decreasing in the fiscal component of x, but eventually 
increasing in the amount of public funds supplied to party leaders as the executive’s national 
electorate starts to perceive deteriorating macro-indicators.  
 In contrast, executives in their last term reduce their efforts to keep spending and taxes 
down since a good reputation in these matters will be of no use for future electoral purposes. 
Even though in their last term, executives may still be interested on achieving conditions for 
effective governability. Because increasing resources increase the likelihood of a stable coalition, 
political vulnerability enters the executive’s decision problem in the form of a cost function, c(x); 
where c(x) is decreasing and unbound in x. Notice that, political vulnerability is decreasing in the 
amount of resources x for both the lame-duck executive and party leaders in the legislature. To 
the extent that increasing resources strengthens the leadership position of all members in the 
governing coalition, a spending bias and fiscal imbalances emerge. 
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 Consequently, the executive’s institutional control over most of the potential components 
of x transforms the task of coalition building and coalition cohesiveness into one of public 
resources allocation. The executive’s optimal offer of x, x’, must satisfy the following first-order 
condition:  
 
 
                                                                                                               
where V’(x) represents the first derivative of V(x) with respect to x and c’(x) represents the first 
derivative of c(x) with respect to x. Coalition cohesiveness is guarantee if the executive’s offer 
matches at least the party leader’s reservation value: x’ x .  
 Moreover, party leaders in the coalition are expected to participate in a substantial, yet 
unknown, number of coalition meetings. The party leader i’s discounted stream of payoffs from 
belonging to and remaining in the governing coalition, Wc, is: 
 
 
 
 
where δ is an exogenous discount factor bounded between 0 and 1. As in Borcherding and Filson 
(2002), the discount factor represents a combination of several factors. First, δ reflects the party 
leader’s patience. More patient leaders have higher discount factors as they discount future 
payoffs at lower rates: δ=1/(1+r), where r is the discount rate. Second, δ reflects the leaders’ 
shared belief about the likelihood of having a meeting in the near future. The higher the 
likelihood of future interactions between the members of a coalition, the higher is the discount 
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factor. Third, δ reflects the time between meetings. The shorter the time between meetings, the 
higher is the discount factor (p. 241).  
 In an informal reciprocity agreement, party leader i may deceive his/her coalition 
membership. For simplicity, consider the case in which an individual party leader abandons the 
coalition in the first meeting. Party leader i’s net present value from defection is: 
 
 
 
 For a coalition to endure, the prospect of ostracism from the coalition must be a credible 
threat. That is, party leader i’s payoff from remaining in the coalition, Wc, must be at least as 
large as the payoff associated with the party leader i deceiving his/her coalition membership: 
 
 
  
 The above condition is more likely to be satisfied when x’ is larger than x’’, δ is high and 
n is small. Alternatively, informal reciprocity agreements sustaining government coalitions are 
likely to occur when bargaining costs, the members’ patience, and the probability of meeting 
again rise, and as the time between meetings and the number of members in the coalition fall. 
 
3.4. Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Outcomes in Latin America 
 
 The Latin America debt crisis of the 1980s provoked concerns regarding how to ensure 
economic progress in the region. The development strategies of the 1960s and 1970s, 
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emphasizing heavy government involvement, were no longer seen as the solution to 
underdevelopment. Instead, these strategies became the culprit for massive government debts, 
high rates of inflation, distorted economic incentives and decreasing entrepreneurship 
(Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Gilpin, 2001). 
 While broad agreement centered on freer markets and trade liberalization, one of the most 
emphasized remedies of structural adjustment was the reduced role of the state in the economy. 
For reformers, fiscal discipline was a primary target. During the 1990s, the case for fiscal 
restraint became stronger as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico went into crisis. Consequently, 
governments across the region initiated several reforms to combat the growth of federal and state 
deficits. While Brazil’s federal government established a fiscal responsibility law and debt 
restructuring agreements with sub-national public administrations, Peru’s Fiscal Responsibility 
and Transparency Law aimed to reduce the deficit of the combined public sector. 
 Notwithstanding the reform efforts to curtail spending, Latin American countries 
routinely live with large deficits. The debt structure of countries throughout the region does not 
improve, with budget deficits actually worsening during the latter half of the 1990s and early 
2000s and public debt averaging 44% of GDP (Clements, Faircloth, & Verhoeven, 2007). 
Moreover, a number of studies identifies the fiscal instability seen in Latin America as one of the 
main determinants for the stop-go growth experience in the region. Fiscal volatility impacts 
growth patterns because it signals a lack of consistency and predictability in policy, which 
hinders investment in productivity-enhancing areas. Between the years 1960-2000, fiscal 
volatility in Latin America was higher than in other regions and is closely associated with lower 
growth performance (Hausmann & Gavin, 1996; Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, & Talvi, 1996).  
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence   
74 
 
 Despite the emphasis put on fiscal responsibility, why do public spending and budget 
imbalances appear persistently increasing across countries in the Latin American region? 
  
3.4.1. The Empirics: Model Specification and Variable Definitions 
  
 This section connects Latin American political institutions to fiscal policy outcomes by 
investigating the impact of presidential term limits on government expenditure and aggregate 
revenue. The study uses panel data from 17 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The data samples cover 
the period 1970-2004. Several nations across the Latin American region were characterized as 
authoritarian during the 1970s and early 1980s. Countries that underwent a change of regime 
during the period of study do not enter the sample unless they classify at least as electoral states. 
  The model specification is an extended version of that of Johnson and Crain’s (2004) 
which examines the effect of executive term limits on fiscal outcomes in 48 democracies, 1972-
1990: 
33
 
 
Pct = αTct + βLct + γZct + εct                                                                                          
 
where c and t are country and time identifiers. The dependent variables are aggregate 
government expenditure and aggregate tax revenue as shares of GDP in constant dollars. The 
                                                          
33
 In line with Rogoff (1990), Johnson and Crain (2004) find countries with one-term limit connected to increases in 
public spending and tax revenue, while countries with two-term limits also experience fiscal volatility. 
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main variable of interest is T, a dichotomous variable for whether the executive is in his/her last 
term in office. T equals one (1) if the executive is in the lame-duck period and zero otherwise. 
 The model specification extends that of Johnson and Crain (2004) to include controls for 
coalition and congress fragmentation. The main variable of interest is no more than a dummy 
indicator for whether executives are in their last term. Conceptually, changes in public spending 
and government revenue may come from policies sanctioned by the legislature. Within this line 
of thought, much scholarly work examines the “weak government hypothesis:” the idea that the 
more fragmented a government, the higher the public spending, deficits, and debt, and the lower 
the chances for tax increases. In his seminal 1959 work, Gordon Tullock thinks of fiscal policy 
making in democratic regimes as an example of the Tragedy of the Commons. If the political and 
pecuniary costs incurred per additional unit of public spending is evenly distributed among all 
budget claimants, a spending bias would emerge because individual claimants cannot be held 
entirely responsible for the problems associated to a deteriorating budget.
34
 Researchers test this 
hypothesis and find, by the greater part, supportive evidence of a Tragedy of the Commons 
problem in fiscal policy; e.g., Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006); Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 
(2007).
35
 In the Latin American context, Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) find that electoral 
formulas of proportional representation in large multi-member districts deteriorate budget 
outcomes because the electoral rule increases the likelihood of more fragmented legislatures and 
coalition governments. In the model specification, L represents a vector of control variables for 
                                                          
34
 Velasco (2000) formalizes Tullock’s discernment in a setting in which the government’s net income is a “common 
property” out of which influential interest groups extract resources to finance expenditures on their preferred items. 
To the extent in which the benefits from spending accrue to each group, while the costs are spread over all 
claimants, a spending bias emerges: transfers are higher than a benevolent planner would choose them to be, fiscal 
deficits emerge regardless the countercyclical purpose of fiscal policy, and in the long run, government debt tends to 
be excessively high (pp. 108-109). 
 
35
 A number of empirical studies actually dismisses the existence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem in fiscal 
policy; e.g., Cheibub (2006), Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery (1996), Sakamoto (2001), Steinmo and Tolbert (1998) 
and Volkerink and de Haan (2001). 
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coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government that I include to 
examine the “weak government” hypothesis. I use the probability that two deputies picked at 
random from among the parties in government will be of different parties (GOVFRAC) as a 
proxy for coalition fragmentation. The proxies for total membership within the parties in 
government are the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in government (HERFGOV) and 
the fraction of seats held by all government parties with respect to the total number of seats in the 
legislature (MAJ). 
 
 
 
 Z represents a vector of economic, demographic, and institutional control variables that 
have been shown determinants of fiscal policy. Control variables include real income per capita, 
population, population density, average rate of inflation, and Sachs measure of trade openness. 
Government  expenditures / GDP Penn World Tables 6.2.
Tax revenues / GDP DataGov-Governance Indicators Database. 
Inter-American Development Bank. Available 
at http://www.iadb.org/datagob/
Income per capita Penn World Tables 6.2.
Population Penn World Tables 6.2.
Population density Penn World Tables 6.2.
Inflation IMF World Economic Outlook.
Trade openess Penn World Tables 6.2.
Gastil index Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. M. 
G. Marshall & K. Jaggers. Center for 
International Development and Conflict 
Management. University of Maryland, College 
Park. Available at 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Executive term limits Stateman’s Yearbook.
Coalition fragmentation and membership 2004 Database of Political Institutions. P. 
Keefer. Development Research Group. The 
World Bank.
Table 3. Data sources
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According to Wagner’s law, the demand for government services is income elastic and is 
expected to rise with higher levels of income. I use the seven-point Gastil Index of Political 
Rights to control for the effect of democratic government on fiscal policy. Democratic 
governments, rather than authoritarian regimes, have an eminent tendency to respond to popular 
pressures which should affect fiscal spending and tax rates. I add controls for the initial levels of 
government spending and revenue in order to account for differences among the nations’ levels 
of public welfare. 
 
 
 
All One-term limit rule Two-term limit rule
Government  expenditures 18.6074 19.4845 19.6958
(4.93) (5.86) (3.64)
Tax revenues 14.6613 14.3540 13.6807
(4.61) (3.69) (1.16)
Income per capita 4707.5110 4581.50 6187.33
(2478.90) (2193.91) (2942.42)
Population 25825.55 31394.23 59109.99
(38923.84) (41716.87) (61122.51)
Population density 53.2982 65.3058 22.6711
(64.65) (73.66) (11.08)
Average inflation (%) 15.3601 16.8775 8.5130
(8.48) (8.05) (10.01)
Trade openess 43.3353 45.2208 31.1543
(22.06) (21.60) (12.22)
Gastil index 2.69 2.7317 3.5652
(1.29) (1.12) (1.50)
GOVFRAC 0.1800 0.1859 0.4035
(0.27) (0.27) (0.34)
HERFGOV 0.8226 0.8175 0.5996
(0.26) (0.27) (0.34)
MAJ 0.5780 0.5639 0.6275
(0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
Table 4. Summary statistics
Countries
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3.4.2. Government Expenditures and Tax Revenues 
 
 Table 5 (below) reports the results for the effect of executive term limits on aggregate 
public expenditures as a share of GDP. I first replicate Johnson and Crain (2004) formulation to 
investigate the effect of executive term limits on government spending. In Model (1), left- and 
right-hand side data enter without transformations. Model (2) replicates Model (1) specification 
except that left- and right-hand variables enter the model as natural logarithms. The results 
indicate that government spending during executive lame-duck terms increases by 16% in 
comparison to those periods in which presidents are up for re-election. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
(1) Government 
Expenditures / GDP
(2) Government 
Expenditures / GDP 
(double-log)
(3) Government 
Expenditures / GDP 
(double-log)
(4) Government 
Expenditures / GDP 
(double-log)
(5) Government 
Expenditures / GDP 
(double-log)
Model Specification: OLS regressions, correlated panels corrected standard errors.
Executive Lame-Duck 2.1403*** 0.1493*** 0.1332*** 0.1333*** 0.1594***
(0.34) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Income Per Capita 0.0001*** 0.0435*** 0.0477*** 0.0477*** 0.0491***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Population Growth 0.0000*** -0.0488*** -0.0410*** -0.0410*** -0.0521***
(0.00) (01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population Density 0.0034 -0.0072 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0040
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average Inflation 0.0008*** 0.0269*** 0.0293*** 0.0293*** 0.0251***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade Openess -0.0221*** -0.0422*** -0.0386*** -0.0386*** -0.0530***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gastil Index -0.1262 -0.0060 -0.0110* -0.0109* -0.0076
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gov. Expenditure 1970 0.5976*** 0.5382*** 0.5131*** 0.5132*** 0.5317***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
GOVFRAC 0.0399
(0.03)
HERFGOV -0.0406
(0.03)
MAJ -0.0526
(0.06)
R
2
0.4454 0.5037 0.5137 0.5138 0.5073
Prob > X
2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 419 414 395 395 395
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004
Table 5.  Government expenditures and executive term limits
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 Models (3) to (5) in Table 5 extend Model (2) to include the controls for coalition 
fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and coalition membership (HERFGOV, MAJ). Coalition 
fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government appear to have a positive 
impact on government spending although this connection shows below the 90% level of 
confidence. Variations in coalition fragmentation and coalition membership do not have a major 
statistical impact on aggregate government expenditures despite the fact that electoral rules of 
proportional representation are likely to back congressional politics. These results diverge in part 
from those in the literature finding unequivocal evidence of a Tragedy of the Commons problem 
in fiscal policy across countries in the Latin American region (Stein et al., 1999). 
 Briefly, throughout Table 5 there is a positive connection above the 99% level of 
confidence between the indicator variable for executives in the lame-duck period (T) and the size 
of the budget as a share of GDP. This connection remains robust to changes in model 
specification and robust to the inclusion of controls for coalition fragmentation and overall 
coalition membership. In line with Rogoff (1990), Latin American presidents in their last term 
reduce their efforts to keep spending down.  
 Table 6 (below) reports the results for the effect of executive term limits on tax revenue 
as a share of GDP. I first replicate the methodology used to study government expenditures 
running a series of random-effects GLS regressions. Throughout Table 6, the control indicator 
for executives in the lame-duck period (T) appears persistently associated to decreases in tax 
revenue although this association remains below the 90% level of confidence.
36
 
                                                          
36
 As a robustness check, I replicate the study using aggregate government revenue as a share of GDP as dependent 
variable. Reliable time series of aggregate government revenue for Latin American countries are rather scarce. I use 
panel data 1990-2004 from the IMF International Financial Statistics and Government Finance Statistics to run a 
series of random-effects GLS regressions. Allowing for some variations in the details, results stay consistent with 
those from the main study. 
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 Against Rogoff’s (1990) contention, Latin American executives seem not to reduce their 
efforts to keep taxes down during their last term in office. A plausible explanation may be found 
in the chief executives’ prospects for future employment. In a prisoner-dilemma-alike theoretical 
framework, Cohen and Spitzer (1996) show that term limits make politicians prone to service 
private interests. Because no higher position in the public administration is available for chief 
executives after their last term, potential after-term employment may likely come from 
businesses and industries that deal directly with the government. In line with Cohen and Spitzer, 
I presume executives to care about private interests because political responsiveness toward 
influential interest groups increases their chances of subsequent employment. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:
(1) Tax Revenues           
/ GDP
(2) Tax Revenues           
/ GDP                
(double-log)
(3) Tax Revenues           
/ GDP                
(double-log)
(4) Tax Revenues           
/ GDP                
(double-log)
(5) Tax Revenues           
/ GDP                
(double-log)
Model Specification: Random-effects GLS regressions.
Executive Lame-Duck -1.6413** -0.0576 -0.0695 -0.0695 -0.0721
(68) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Income Per Capita 0.0010*** 0.5752*** 0.6100*** 0.6097*** 0.5630***
(0.00) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Population Growth 0.0000 -0.1474 -0.1725* -0.1724* -0.1462
(0.00) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Population Density 0.0047 -0.1601 -0.1605 -0.1603 -0.1513
(0.01) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12)
Average Inflation -0.0003* -0.0763*** -0.0741*** -0.0742*** -0.0776***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Trade Openess 0.0026 0.1205 0.0536 0.0538 0.0824
(0.02) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Gastil Index -0.0871 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0027
(0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gov. Revenue 1970 0.1006 0.3227** 0.3293* 0.3293* 0.3340**
(0.22) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
GOVFRAC 0.0681
(0.05)
HERFGOV -0.0685
(0.05)
MAJ 0.0134
(0.07)
R
2
0.2448 0.3167 0.3462 0.3463 0.3170
Prob > X
2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 274 273 263 263 266
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 90% confidence level, ** significant at 95% confidence level, *** significant at 99% confidence level.
17 Latin American electoral states, 1970-2004
Table 6.  Tax revenues and executive term limits
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 Model (3) in Table 6 introduces the control for coalition fragmentation. Higher coalition 
fragmentation seems to positively impact tax revenue, although this association shows below the 
90% level of confidence. In Models (4) and (5) in Table 6, I introduce the controls for total 
membership of all parties in government on an individual basis. In both cases, the variable 
indicators for overall coalition membership fall short of statistical significance as well. 
 The results on the control variables appear as expected. Income per capita and population 
appear associated to increases in government spending and tax revenue as shares of GDP. In 
Latin America, like in Western Europe, trade openness seems to go along with fiscal restraint as 
part of the neoliberal reform packages. The Gastil Index of Political Rights appears negatively 
associated to government spending and tax revenue. This finding contradicts the conventional 
wisdom that more democratic institutions favor spending and preclude tax increases, even under 
governments with conservative ideology. The controls for the initial levels of government 
spending and tax revenue show positively associated and statistically significant above the 90% 
level of confidence. 
 In sum, even though executive term limits in Latin America affect spending behavior in 
the same manner as they do in U.S. states and other democracies, Latin American presidents 
seem not to reduce their efforts to keep taxes down during their last term. Coalition 
fragmentation appears to play at best a marginal role at explaining aggregate spending and 
aggregate tax revenue. Different from Johnson and Crain (2004) who find that tax revenues 
increase during an incumbent’s binding term, in Latin America tax revenues decrease, suggesting 
that spending practices have an even more disastrous effect by creating fiscal deficits. 
Considering that revenues may be lower either because of less general effort or because 
politicians’ grant tax breaks just before elections for the same reasons that they spend more, the 
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trend is that incumbent’s policies in their binding term are serving short-term benefits to some at 
the expense of longer-term costs to everyone. These findings have disturbing consequences for 
the region since revenues are not complementing spending, and the fiscal state of each country is 
left in disequilibrium. In the next section, I discuss the recent presidential term limit changes and 
examine the varying impact that these institutional differences have on fiscal outcomes. 
 
3.4.3. One-Term vs. Two-Term Limits 
 
 Between 1970 and 2004, most Latin American presidents were institutionally constrained 
to run for reelection. In the last 15 years, several Latin American countries have initiated 
constitutional changes to presidential term limits. Executive term limit rules have changed in six 
Latin American countries. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela have 
had constitutional reforms that changed presidential term limits from a one-term rule to a two-
term limit rule. Argentina was the first to change the term limit rule. A 1994 constitutional 
reform reduced the presidential term to four years and limited the president and vice president to 
two consecutive terms. Presidents are now allowed to stand for a third term or more after an 
interval of at least one term. In 1995, Peru adopted the two-term limit rule for the executive. 
After one interim term, former presidents may be reelected. A 1996 law allowed President 
Alberto Fujimori to run for a third term, but this was due to the fact that his first term began prior 
to the 1995 constitutional amendments. In Brazil, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
proposed to amend the Constitution in order to be re-elected. By 1997 the Brazilian Congress 
voted for the re-election amendment in the constitution, and Cardoso became the first Brazilian 
president to be re-elected for a second term. In Venezuela, as Hugo Chavez took power in 1999, 
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various constitutional changes took place, including one allowing the president to run for two 
consecutive terms and the passage of a 2009 amendment that allows the president to run for 
reelection indefinitely. In Costa Rica, a constitutional ban for incumbents to run for re-election 
was overturned in 2004. An incumbent, however, has to await an inter-term period before 
running again for office. In Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe sought a constitutional 
amendment during his first term that allowed him to run for office again. Uribe was re-elected in 
the 2006 presidential race.  
 These changes in term limits in several Latin American offer a unique opportunity to test 
the for the effects of alternative presidential term limit rules on fiscal responsibility. The 
implications from the reputation building model of politics establishes that two-term limits create 
different incentives than binding term limits, making politicians act differently under these two 
institutional environments (Besley & Case, 1995; Johnson & Crain, 2004).  
 I test for the difference on fiscal outcomes between executive lame-duck periods in 
countries under single-term vs. two-term limits rule. For the case of government spending, I use 
separate dummy variables for the one-term and two-term limit countries and run a series of OLS 
regressions correlated panels corrected standard errors for the period 1970-2004. Table 7 (below) 
reports the results. Throughout Table 7, left- and right-hand side variables enter as natural 
logarithms. Model (1) shows the case in which we add separate dummy variables for the one-
term and two-term limit countries. The results resemble those of Johnson and Crain (2004) who 
found robust evidence of lame-duck executives under single-term limit rule spending more on 
average than those in countries under two term-limit rule. The coefficient of the one-term limit 
country is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The coefficient on 
the lame duck indicator in two-term limit countries is positive and statistically significant at the 
Chapter 3. Elite-Centered Candidate Selection Enables Executive Prevalence   
84 
 
99% confidence level as well. Spending as a share of GDP increases 2% more during the lame 
duck of one-term limit presidents compared to the lame duck term of two-term limit presidents. 
However, controlling for executive lame-duck periods under one- and two-term limits rule does 
not improve significantly the R2 (0.5054) in comparison to our results when we do not control 
for the alternative rules (0.5037). 
 In order to study the problem of the commons in government spending, Models (2) to (4) 
in Table 7 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation (GOVFRAC) and total membership 
of the parties in government (HERFGOV, MAJ) for the case in which the executive is always in 
his/her last term. Models (5) to (7) in Table 7 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation 
for the case in which the executive is in the lame-duck period under two-term limit rule. By 
means of controlling for the alternative term-limit rules, the results diverge from those in which 
executives are in their final period regardless the term-limit rule. Throughout Table 7, there is 
evidence of an increasing role of party politics on government spending decisions, in particular 
during the lame-duck period of executives under two-term limit rule. In this case, higher 
coalition fragmentation appears associated to increases in spending above the 99% level of 
confidence. Increases in total membership of the parties in government show a robust connection 
to increases in government spending above the 99% level of confidence as well. 
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 I examine the effect of the alternative executive term-limits rules and the problem of the 
commons on tax revenues. I replicate the methodology used to study government spending 
except that I run a series of random-effects GLS regressions, 1970-2004. Table 8 (below) reports 
the results.  
 Model (1) in Table 8 shows the results for the case in which I add separate dummy 
variables for the executive one-term and two-term limit countries. The results for the Latin 
American region differ from those of Johnson and Crain (2004) who found a positive connection 
between government revenue and their variable indicators for the alternative executive term-limit 
rules. In Model (1), the coefficient of the one-term limit country is negative and below the 90% 
level of confidence. The coefficient of the lame duck indicator in two-term limit countries is 
positive and statistically insignificant. Moreover, controlling for executive lame-duck periods 
under one- and two-term limits rules does not improve the value of the R
2
 (0.3167) in 
comparison to the case where there is no control for the alternative rules (0.3151). 
 Models (2) to (4) in Table 8 introduce the controls for coalition fragmentation 
(GOVFRAC) and total membership of the parties in government (HERFGOV, MAJ) for the case 
in which a single term-limit rule constrains the executive to run for reelection. In all three 
models, the coefficient indicator for lame-duck executives shows negative and statistically 
insignificant below the 90% level of confidence. Models (5) to (7) in Table 8 introduce the 
controls for coalition fragmentation and total membership of the parties in government for the 
case in which the executive is in the lame-duck period under two-term limit rule.  
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 In Models (5) to (7) in Table 8 (above), the coefficient indicator for lame-duck executives 
shows positive and statistically insignificant. Latin American presidents under single term-limits 
rule do not reduce their efforts to keep taxes down. In contrast, lame-duck chief executives under 
two-term limits rule appear to care less about their reputations in this matter. Higher coalition 
fragmentation appears to have a positive effect on taxation decisions regardless the executive 
term-limits rule. However, this association remains short of statistical significance below the 
90% level of confidence. Overall, the results support the view that institutional differences in 
executive term-limits rules do impact fiscal performance. 
 Summarizing, while mixed evidence supports alternative theories explaining fiscal 
outcomes, and the empirical approach in this section dismisses the existence of a Tragedy of the 
Commons problem in fiscal policy, it is evident that the results raise the prospect that Latin 
American presidents may actually prevail on fiscal policy. I measure presidential term limits’ 
effects on fiscal spending and aggregate revenue. Results indicate a positive and robust 
connection between executive lame-duck periods and increases in government spending. 
Executive term limits, however, appear not to have a significant impact on tax revenue. Party 
fragmentation within the government coalition and total membership of the parties in 
government appear to play only a marginal role at explaining aggregate spending and taxation 
outcomes.  
 To conclude, the above findings have alarming consequences for the region since 
revenues may not be complementing spending, and the fiscal state of each country may be left in 
disequilibrium. Indeed, the results suggest that the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline creates 
the conditions wherein economic mishaps are fostered. This chapter then complements recent 
scholarship on budgetary outcomes which illustrates the negative impact that powerful presidents 
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have upon budgetary outcomes. In Colombia, for instance, budget deficits have worsened since 
the increased concentration of power in the executive branch (Cardenas, Mejia, & Olivera, 
2007). In Peru, a powerful president at the expense of a weak Congress has led to opportunistic 
behavior in the executive branch (Valderrama, Carranza, & Chávez, 2007).  
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 “I wish to assert a much more fundamental role for institutions in societies; they are the 
underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies (p. 107).” North, D. (1990). 
Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
 
 Efforts in the scholarly literature to identify the economic sources of growth and 
prosperity are plenty. Not so abundant, however, studies examining the conditions under which 
governments in general, and public officials in particular, are likely to pursue sound policies. 
This dissertation adds to the political economy literature by introducing the intra-party candidate 
nomination methods as an essential institutional aspect that must be taken into account if we 
want to understand the politicians’ representation efforts and policy choices. Because the initial 
step in the process of running for public office is that of achieving party nomination before every 
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election, incumbents interested on reelection must first be responsive to the demands of the party 
gatekeepers with the power to add the politician’s name to the electoral ballot.  
 While political scientists have long recognized the relevance of the methods employed by 
political parties to select candidates for general elections, the economic effects of candidate 
selection have attracted much less consideration from researchers in the field of political 
economy. Using a simple constrained maximization model, I show that, if running for reelection, 
increasing participation and democratization of the candidate selection methods increases the 
incumbent’s induced propensity to represent the interests of regular voters that habitually value 
economic affluence. Quite the opposite, away from a democratic process, party nomination 
decisions on the hands of the few increase the incumbent’s responsiveness to the often growth-
retarding demands of narrow concerns.
37
 Accordingly, the political parties’ choice of methods to 
nominate candidates for electoral contestation may have important economic consequences. In 
support to this view, a simple cross-country inspection of the intra-party candidate nomination 
methods reveals an empirical regularity: In the developed world intra-party nomination decisions 
appear largely informed by inclusive and democratic practices; in the less-developed world 
events of intraparty participatory politics are for the most part absent, with nomination decisions 
often monopolized by national party leaders and local party bosses. 
 Consequently, this dissertation adds to the literature finding institutions a precursor of 
economic affluence and prosperity (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; North & Thomas, 1970, 1973; 
North, 1981, 1990; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Hall & Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robisnson, 2001, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian & 
                                                          
37
 Indeed, in democratic regimes, regularly scheduled elections and rotation in office may not be enough to deter 
politicians from representing the often growth-retarding demands of special interests. 
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Trebbi, 2004).
38
 The alternative view sees institutional development as an eventual outcome of a 
process that may begin with a, perhaps autocratic, pro-growth ruler adopting policies conducive 
to physical and human capital accumulation, increased education and wealth that eventually lead 
to institutional improvement and democratic governance (Lipset, 1960; Barro, 1999; Przeworski, 
Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, 2000; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2003; 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2004). Instead, this dissertation advances the 
idea that in democratic regimes where the institutional structure, in general, and candidate 
selection, in particular, induce the polity to represent the interests of the whole, prosperity will 
follow.  
  Much is left to be done. If we consent to the idea that the economic consequences of the 
parties’ choice of method to nominate candidates may be substantial, understanding the motives 
behind these choices becomes crucial. Historically, sustained economic growth, particularly in 
per capita terms, first occurred in England some time in the latter part of seventeenth century. 
Even though incipient by modern standards, the development of private property was well under 
way. In addition, a patent system and laws protecting intellectual rights, and a functioning legal 
system of common law with the power to enforce contracts made possible that factors of 
production, including land and labor, received their pecuniary values. Prices, rewards and 
subsidies were also used, for the most part, to encourage innovation and productivity growth 
(North & Thomas, 1970, p. 16). The specific conditions that motivated the English Crown and 
members of Parliament to create an institutional structure that encouraged economic affluence by 
the end of the 1600’s are all subject of further research.  
                                                          
38
 This line of research can actually be traced back to Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776) who made a case of a 
limited government as a growth promoting institution.  
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 In Olson’s (1982) view, the advancement of civil and political rights require the polity to 
pursue policies that benefit the whole. The effects of alternative candidate nomination methods 
might prove crucial in order to understand the induced propensity of politicians to advance 
policies that improve the quality of democracy. Interestingly, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
all countries in which nomination decisions are on the hands of oligarchic party elites, are 
consistently ranked below their counterparts in Western Europe by the 7‐point scale Gastil index 
(www.Freedomhouse.org) used by the Freedom House to measure political rights and civil 
liberties on a yearly basis.  
 Sound policy is common knowledge. Yet, we have witnessed the failure of many 
governments over the world to adopt and maintain over time policy frameworks that promote 
economic affluence. If we acknowledge economic strategy as the fundamental source of 
economic progress and policy frameworks as mindful choices, then researchers’ efforts ought to 
expose the policy-makers’ motives. Ever since Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) 
demonstrated the prevalence of political institution as a growth determinant, the political 
economy literature has often stressed differences in political institutions in order to explain 
policy variations, then growth and development. This dissertation explored the detrimental 
effects that political institutions such as term limits and centralized candidate selection have on 
the politicians’ policy choices and economic outcomes. Within the same line of thought, in the 
US, Colorado and Oklahoma followed California’s political path by voting in 1992 to impose 
term limits on their state legislatures. As of today, more than twenty states in the US incorporate 
some type of term limits on their respective assemblies. The national debate over term limit 
legislation started back in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s under the premises that there was a 
perceived lack of responsiveness and accountability from the state legislators. Opponents of term 
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limits believed exactly the opposite and viewed imposition of term limits as a tool for reducing 
legislator’s motivation and responsiveness to the public. Clearly, both positions cannot be 
simultaneously true. Scholars may find the idea of growth-retarding institutions a source of 
inspiration for research purposes. 
 To conclude, I would like to state the obvious. Overlooking the details, there are about 30 
countries in which the political system has been able to provide the conditions for economic 
affluence and prosperity to take place. With 30 cases in record, it should not be that difficult to 
build a reach country on purpose. 
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ISO-Code Country Selected References on Candidate Selection 
DZA Algeria African Personal Rule: Jackson and Rosberg (1982a,b, 
1994), Young and Turner (1985), Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997), Van de Walle (2001). African Party Politics: 
Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet (2003), Salih (2003) 
ARG Argentina Escudero (2001), De Luca, Jones and Tula (2002), Jones 
(2002) 
AUS Australia Jupp (1964), Epstein (1977, 1980), Weller (1983), 
Gallagher (1988b), Norris, Carty, Erickson, Lovenduski 
and Simms (1990), Studlar and McAllister (1991), Simms 
(1993, 1996), McAllister (1997), Parkin (1999), Simms and 
Warhurst (2000) 
AUT Austria Gallagher (1988b), Müller (1992, 1994), Mair (1994), 
O'Regan (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair 
(2001) 
BGD Bangladesh Baxter (1999) 
BEL Belgium Obler (1974), Epstein (1980), De Winter (1988), Gallagher 
(1988b), Deschouwer (1992, 1994), Mair (1994), Andrews 
(1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001), 
Pennings and Hazan (2001) 
BOL Bolivia Gamarra and Malloy (1995), Lucero (1999) 
BWA Botswana Dale (1999), Kopecký and Mair (2003: 317). African 
Personal Rule: Jackson and Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), 
Young and Turner (1985), Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997), Van de Walle (2001). African Party Politics: 
Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet (2003), Salih (2003) 
BRA Brazil Mainwaring (1995), Guzman and Sena de Oliveira (2001) 
CMR Cameroon DeLancey (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). 
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet 
(2003), Salih (2003) 
CAN Canada Siegfried (1966) [1906], Dawson (1947), Scarrow (1964), 
Perlin (1975), Epstein (1980), Williams (1981), Landes 
(1983), Jackson, Jackson and Baxter-Moore (1986), 
Gallagher (1988a,b), Norris, Carty, Erickson, Lovenduski 
and Simms (1990), Carty and Erickson (1991), Erickson 
and Carty (1991), Erickson (1993), Norris (1996), Erickson 
(1997), Sayers (1999), Carty, Cross and Young (2000), 
Pennings and Hazan (2001), Cross (2002) 
Appendix A 
112 
 
CAF Central 
African 
Republic 
O'Toole (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). 
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet 
(2003), Salih (2003) 
CHL Chile Scully (1995), Siavelis (2002) 
COL Colombia Duff (1971), Gallagher (1988b), Archer (1995) 
CRI Costa Rica Taylor (1992), Carey (1996, 1997), Taylor-Robinson 
(2001) 
DNK Denmark Fitzmaurice (1981), Bille (1992, 1994, 2001), Mair (1994), 
Thomas (1999), Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001), 
Pennings and Hazan (2001), Pedersen, Bille, Buch, Elklit, 
Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 
DOM Dominican 
Republic 
Alum and Wessman (1999)  
ECU Ecuador Legislative reelection allowed 1996 thereafter. Schodt 
(1999) 
SLV El Salvador Crisp (2000) 
ETH Ethiopia Abbink (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). 
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet 
(2003), Salih (2003) 
FIN Finland Arter (1980), Elder, Ranney (1981), Thomas and Arter 
(1982), Thomas (1985), Gallagher (1988b), Sundberg and 
Gylling (1992), Sundberg (1994), Helander (1997), Farrell 
(1999), Bille (2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001), 
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001) 
FRA France Thiébault (1988), Frears (1991), Andrews (1999), Evans 
(2003), Knapp (2004) 
GER Germany Kitzinger (1960), Epstein (1980), Gallagher 
(1988b),Roberts (1988), Bawn (1992), Poguntke and Boll 
(1992), Kolinsky (1993), Mair (1994), Poguntke (1994), 
Norris (1996), Wessels (1997), Smith (1999), Bille (2001), 
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001), Korte (2003) 
GRC Greece Kohler (1982), Gallagher (1988a,b) 
GTM Guatemala Rosada (1992) 
HND Honduras Morris (1984), Rosenberg (1989), Norsworthy and Barry 
(1993), Taylor (1996) 
ISL Iceland Hardarson (1995, 1999), Kristjánsson (1998), Gallagher, 
Laver and Mair (2001), Hazan (2002)  
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IND India Weiner (1967, 1987), Gallagher (1988b), Alam (1992), 
Dasgupta (2002), Jana and Sarmah (2002), Report 
Submitted by The National Commission to Review the 
Working of the Constitution, Ministry of Law and Justice, 
Government of India, 2002, available at 
www.lawmin.nic.in, Arora (2003), Godbole (2003), Gosh 
(2003), Chandra (2004) 
IRL Ireland Gallagher (1988b,c), Galligan (1993), Farrell (1992, 1994), 
Mair (1994), Ward (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver 
and Mair (2001), Pennings and Hazan (2001) 
ISR Israel Kraines (1961), Seligman (1964), Epstein (1980), Goldberg 
(1980), Doron and Goldberg (1990), Arian and Shamir 
(1999), Hazan (1999), Rahat and Sher-Hadar (1999), 
Hazan and Rahat (2000), Rahat and Hazan (2001), Hazan 
(2002), Lundell (2004) 
ITA Italy Wertman (1988), Gallagher (1988b), Bardi and Morlino 
(1992, 1994), Guadagnini (1993), Bille (2001) 
JPN Japan Gallagher (1988a,b), Shiratori (1988), Fukai and Fukui 
(1992), Hrebenar (1992), Fukui (1997) 
KOR Korea, Rep. Thornton and Kovick (2003) 
LUX Luxembourg Andrews (1999), Lundell (2002, 2004) 
MDG Madagascar Meyers (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). 
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet 
(2003), Salih (2003) 
MWI Malawi Lanz (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and Rosberg 
(1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), Bratton and 
van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). African Party 
Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet (2003), Salih 
(2003) 
MYS Malaysia Hing and Ong (1987), Thornton (2003) 
MLI Mali Imperato (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). 
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet 
(2003), Salih (2003) 
MEX Mexico No (immediate) legislative reelection. Story (1992), Camp 
(1993), Craig and Cornelius (1995), Casar (2002), Nacif 
(2002), Langston (2006), Wuhs (2006) 
MOZ Mozambique Griffiths (1999). African Personal Rule: Jackson and 
Rosberg (1982a,b, 1994), Young and Turner (1985), 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Van de Walle (2001). 
African Party Politics: Cranenburgh (2003), Doorenspleet 
(2003), Salih (2003) 
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NPL Nepal Wallem and Guragain (2003) 
NLD Netherlands Gallagher (1988a,b), Koole and Leijenaar (1988), Koole 
and van de Velde (1992), Leijenaar (1993), Koole (1994), 
Mair (1994), Leijenaar and Niemöller (1997), Andrews 
(1999), Bille (2001), Hazan (2002) 
NZL New Zealand Epstein (1980), Jackson (1980), Gallagher (1988a,b), 
Mulgan (1994), Catt (1997) 
NIC Nicaragua Oquist (1992), Prevost (1992), LeoGrande (1992) 
NGA Nigeria Bienen (1987) 
NOR Norway Valen and Katz (1964), Epstein (1980), Gallagher (1988b), 
Valen (1966, 1988), Svåsand (1992, 1994), Madeley and 
Kadel (1999), Bille (2001), Gallagher, Laver and Mair 
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